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Abstract
In this work we consider the interplay between multiprover interactive proofs, quantum en-
tanglement, and zero knowledge proofs — notions that are central pillars of complexity theory,
quantum information and cryptography. In particular, we study the relationship between the
complexity class MIP∗, the set of languages decidable by multiprover interactive proofs with
quantumly entangled provers, and the class PZK-MIP∗, which is the set of languages decidable
by MIP∗ protocols that furthermore possess the perfect zero knowledge property.
Our main result is that the two classes are equal, i.e., MIP∗ = PZK-MIP∗. This result pro-
vides a quantum analogue of the celebrated result of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian, and Wigderson
(STOC 1988) who show that MIP = PZK-MIP (in other words, all classical multiprover inter-
active protocols can be made zero knowledge). We prove our result by showing that every
MIP∗ protocol can be efficiently transformed into an equivalent zero knowledge MIP∗ protocol
in a manner that preserves the completeness-soundness gap. Combining our transformation
with previous results by Slofstra (Forum of Mathematics, Pi 2019) and Fitzsimons, Ji, Vidick
and Yuen (STOC 2019), we obtain the corollary that all co-recursively enumerable languages
(which include undecidable problems as well as all decidable problems) have zero knowledge
MIP∗ protocols with vanishing promise gap.
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1 Introduction
Multiprover interactive proofs (MIPs) are a model of computation where a probabilistic polynomial
time verifier interacts with several all-powerful — but non-communicating — provers to check
the validity of a statement (for example, whether a quantified boolean formula is satisfiable). If
the statement is true, then there is a strategy for the provers to convince the verifier of this fact.
Otherwise, for all prover strategies, the verifier rejects with high probability. This gives rise to
the complexity class MIP, which is the set of all languages that can be decided by MIPs. This
model of computation was first introduced by Ben-Or, Goldwasser, Kilian and Wigderson [6]. A
foundational result in complexity theory due to Babai, Fortnow, and Lund shows that multiprover
interactive proofs are surprisingly powerful: MIP is actually equal to the class of problems solvable
in non-deterministic exponential time, i.e., MIP = NEXP [2].
Research in quantum complexity theory has led to the study of quantum MIPs. In one of the
most commonly considered models, the verifier interacts with provers that are quantumly entangled.
Even though the provers still cannot communicate with each other, they can utilize correlations aris-
ing from local measurements on entangled quantum states. Such correlations cannot be explained
classically, and the study of the counter-intuitive nature of these correlations dates back to the fa-
mous 1935 paper of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen [18] and the seminal work of Bell in 1964 [4].
Over the past twenty years, MIPs with entangled provers have provided a fruitful computational
lens through which the power of such correlations can be studied. The set of languages decidable
by such interactive proofs is denoted by MIP∗, where the asterisk denotes the use of entanglement.
Finally, another type of interactive proof system are zero knowledge proofs. These were intro-
duced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [21] and have played a crucial role in the development
of theoretical cryptography. In this model, if the claimed statement is indeed true, the interaction
between the verifier and prover must be conducted in such a way that the verifier learns nothing
else aside from the validity of the statement. This is formalized by requiring the existence of an
efficient simulator whose output is indistinguishable from the distribution of the messages in a real
execution of the protocol. It was shown by [6] that any (classical) MIP protocol can be transformed
into an equivalent perfect zero knowledge1 MIP protocol. In other words, the complexity classes
MIP (and thus NEXP) and PZK-MIP are equal, where the latter consists of all languages decidable
by perfect zero knowledge MIPs.
Informally stated, our main result is a quantum analogue of the result of Ben-Or, Goldwasser,
Kilian, and Wigderson [6]: we show that
Every MIP* protocol can be efficiently transformed into an equivalent zero knowledge MIP* protocol.
Phrased in complexity-theoretic terms, we show that MIP∗ = PZK-MIP∗. This is a strengthen-
ing of the recent results of Chiesa, Forbes, Gur and Spooner, who show that NEXP = MIP ⊆
PZK-MIP∗ [10] (which is, in turn, a strengthening of the the result of Ito and Vidick that NEXP ⊆
MIP∗ [24]).
Surprisingly, there are no upper bounds known on the power of quantum MIPs. The recent
spectacular result of Natarajan and Wright shows that MIP∗ contains the complexity class NEEXP,
which is the enormously powerful class of problems that can be solved in non-deterministic dou-
bly exponential time [32]. Since NEXP 6= NEEXP via the non-deterministic time hierarchy theo-
rem [14], this unconditionally shows that quantum MIPs are strictly more powerful than classical
MIPs. Furthermore, it is conceivable that MIP∗ even contains undecidable languages. In [36, 37],
Slofstra proved that determining whether a given MIP* protocol admits a prover strategy that wins
1The term perfect refers to the property that the interaction in a real protocol can be simulated without any error.
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with certainty is an undecidable problem. In [19], Fitzsimons, Ji, Vidick and Yuen showed that
the class MIP∗1,1−ε(n), the set of languages decidable by MIPs protocols with promise gap ε(n) that
can depend on the input size, contains NTIME[2poly(1/ε(n))], the class of problems that are solvable
in non-deterministic time 2poly(1/ε(n)). In contrast, the complexity of MIP (even with a shrinking
promise gap) is always equal to NEXP.
Thus, our result implies that all languages in NEEXP – and any larger complexity classes discov-
ered to be contained within MIP∗ – have perfect zero knowledge interactive proofs with entangled
provers. In fact, we prove a stronger statement: every MIP∗ protocol with promise gap ε also
has an equivalent zero knowledge MIP∗ protocol with promise gap that is polynomially related to
ε. This, combined with the results of [19] and [37], implies that languages of arbitrarily large
time complexity – including some undecidable problems – have zero knowledge proofs (albeit with
vanishing promise gap).
1.1 Our results
We state our results in more detail. Let MIP∗c,s[k, r] denote the set of languages L that admit k-
prover, r-round MIP* protocols with completeness c, and soundness s. In other words, there exists
a probabilistic polynomial-time verifier V that interacts with k entangled provers over r rounds so
that if x ∈ L, then there exists a prover strategy that causes V (x) to accept with probability at
least c; 2 otherwise all prover strategies cause V (x) to accept with probability strictly less than s.
The class PZK-MIP∗c,s[k, r] are the languages that have MIP
∗[k, r] protocols where the interaction
between the verifier can be simulated exactly and efficiently, without the aid of any provers. We
provide formal definitions of these complexity classes in Section 2.3.
In what follows, let n denote the input size. The parameters k, r, s of a protocol are also allowed
to depend on the input size. In this paper, unless stated otherwise, we assume that completeness
parameter c in a protocol is equal to 1.
Theorem 1. For all 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, for all polynomially bounded functions k, r,
MIP∗1,s[k, r] ⊆ PZK-MIP∗1,s′ [k + 4, 1]
where s′ = 1− (1− s)α for some universal constant α > 0.
The first corollary of Theorem 1 concerns what we call fully quantum MIPs, which are multi-
prover interactive proofs where the verifier can perform polynomial time quantum computations
and exchange quantum messages with entangled quantum provers. The set of languages decidable
by fully quantum MIPs is denoted by QMIP, which clearly includes MIP∗. Reichardt, Unger, and
Vazirani [35] showed that the reverse inclusion also holds by adding two additional provers; i.e.,
that QMIP[k] ⊆ MIP∗[k+2]. Combined with Theorem 1 and the fact that we can assume that QMIP
protocols have perfect completeness if we add an additional prover (see [38]), this implies that
Corollary 2. For all polynomially bounded functions k, r, we have
QMIP1, 1
2
[k, r] ⊆ PZK-MIP∗
1, 1
2
[k + 4, 1].
The combination of the results in [19] and [32] implies that for every hyper-exponential func-
tion f ,3 we have that
NTIME[22
f(n)
] ⊆ MIP∗1,s[4, 1],
2Technically speaking, the completeness condition actually corresponds to a sequence of prover strategies with success
probability approaching c; we discuss this subtlety in Section 2.4.
3A hyper-exponential function f(n) is of the form exp(· · · exp(poly(n)) · · · ), where the number of iterated exponen-
tials is R(n) for some time-constructible function R(n).
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where NTIME[g(n)] denotes the set of languages that can be decided by nondeterministic Turing
machines running in time g(n) and s = 1 − Cf(n)−c for some universal constants C and c, inde-
pendent of n.4 Combining this with Theorem 1, we obtain the following.
Corollary 3. There exist universal constants C, c > 0 such that for all hyper-exponential functions
f : N→ N,
NTIME[22
f(n)
] ⊆ PZK-MIP∗1,s[6, 1]
where s = 1− Cf(n)−c.
Finally, it was also shown in [19, 37] that the undecidable languageNONHALT, which consists
of Turing machines that do not halt when run on the empty input tape, is contained in MIP∗1,1[2, 1].
The “1, 1” subscript indicates that for negative instances (i.e., Turing machines that do halt), the
verifier rejects with positive probability. In more detail: there exists a polynomial time computable
function that maps Turing machines M to an MIP∗ protocol VM such that if M does not halt on
the empty input tape, then there is a prover strategy for VM that is accepted with probability
1; otherwise there exists a positive constant ε > 0 (depending on M) such that for all prover
strategies, the protocol VM rejects with probability ε.
Theorem 1 implies there is a polynomial time computable mapping VM 7→ V ′M such that V ′M is
a PZK-MIP∗ protocol that preserves completeness (if VM accepts with probability 1, then so does
V ′M) and soundness (if VM rejects with probability ε for all prover strategies, then V
′
M rejects with
probability poly(ε) for all prover strategies). Therefore, we can conclude the following:
Corollary 4. NONHALT ∈ PZK-MIP∗1,1[4, 1].
Corollary 4 implies that all co-recursively enumerable languages (languages whose complement
are recursively enumerable) have zero knowledge proofs (with vanishing gap).
1.2 Proof overview
The proof of Theorem 1 draws upon a number of ideas and techniques that have been developed to
study interactive protocols with entangled provers. At a high level, the proof proceeds as follows.
Let L be a language that is decided by some k-prover MIP* protocol with a verifier V . Assume for
simplicity that on positive instances x ∈ L, there is a prover strategy that causes V to accept with
probability 1, and otherwise rejects with high probability. Although V is probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) Turing machine in a MIP* protocol, we can instead think of it as a quantum circuit
involving a combination of verifier computations, and prover computations.
First, we transform the verifier V into an equivalent quantum circuit Venc where the computa-
tion is now performed on encoded data. We do this using techniques from quantum fault-tolerance,
where the data is protected using a quantum error correcting code, and physical operations are
performed on the encoded data in order to effect logical operations on the underlying logical data.
We then apply protocol compression to Venc to obtain a new verifier VZK for an equivalent
protocol — this will be our zero knowledge MIP* protocol. Protocol compression is a technique
that was pioneered by Ji in [25] (and further developed by Fitzsimons, Ji, Vidick and Yuen [19])
to show that NEXP has 1-round MIP∗ protocols where the communication is logarithmic length.
4The original result in [19] states that for all hyper-exponential functions f(n), NTIME[2f(n)] ⊆ MIP∗1,s[15, 1] for
s = 1 = Cf(n)−c. Using a more efficient error correcting code as described in Section A, the number of provers can
be reduced to 4. The improvement from NTIME[2f(n)] to NTIME[22
f(n)
] is obtained by plugging in the NEEXP ⊆ MIP∗
result of Natarajan and Wright [32] as the “base case” of the iterated compression scheme, instead of the NEXP ⊆ MIP∗
result of Natarajan and Vidick [31].
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Essentially, in the compressed protocol, the new verifier VZK efficiently checks whether Venc would
have accepted in the original protocol without actually having to run Venc, by testing that the
provers hold an entangled history state of a successful interaction between Venc and some provers.
The reason this compressed protocol is zero knowledge is the following: the verifier VZK asks
the provers to report the outcomes of performing local measurements in order to verify that they
hold an accepting history state. In the positive case (i.e., x ∈ L), there is an “honest” strategy
where the provers share a history state |Φ〉 of a successful interaction with Venc. We argue that,
because of the fault-tolerance properties of Venc, individual local measurements on |Φ〉 reveal no
information about the details of the interaction. Put another way, the distribution of outcomes of
honest provers’ local measurements can be efficiently simulated, without the aid of any provers at
all. Since we only require that this simulatability property holds with respect to honest provers,
this establishes the zero knowledge property of the protocol run by VZK .
In the next few sections, we provide more details on the components of this transformation. We
discuss things in reverse order: first, we give an overview of the protocol compression technique.
Then, we discuss the fault tolerant encoding Venc of the original verifier V . Then we describe how
applying protocol compression to Venc yields a zero knowledge protocol for L.
1.2.1 Protocol compression
The protocol compression technique of [25, 19] transforms any k-prover, r-round QMIP protocol
where the verifier V runs in timeN into a k+O(1)-prover, 1-round MIP* protocol where the verifier
V ′ runs in time poly logN . In other words, the verifier has been compressed into an exponentially
more efficient one; however, this comes with the price of having the promise gap shrink as well: if
the promise gap of the original QMIP protocol is ε, then the promise gap of the compressed protocol
is poly(ε/N).
This compression is achieved as follows: in the protocol executed by the compressed verifier
V ′, the provers are tested to show that they possess an (encoding of) a history state of the original
protocol executed by V , describing an execution of the protocol in which the original verifier V
accepts. History states of some T -length computation generally look like the following:
|ψ〉 = 1√
T + 1
T∑
t=0
|t〉 ⊗ |ψt〉.
The first register holding the superposition over |t〉 is called the clock register; the second regis-
ter holding the superposition over |ψt〉 is called the snapshot register. The t-th snapshot of the
computation |ψt〉 is the global state of the protocol at time t:
|ψt〉 = gtgt−1 · · · g1|ψ0〉
where the gi’s are the gates used in the protocol, and |ψ0〉 is the initial state of the protocol. Usually,
each gi is a one- or two-qubit gate that is part of the verifier V ’s computation. However, gi could
also represent a prover gate, which is the computation performed by one of the k provers. Unlike
gates in the verifier’s computation, the prover gates are non-local, and there is no characterization
of their structure. In general, they may have exponential circuit complexity, and may act on a
Hilbert space that can be much larger than the space used by the verifier V .
This notion of history states for interactive protocols is a generalization of the basic concept of
history states for quantum circuits, which was introduced by Kitaev to prove that the local Hamilto-
nians problem is QMA-complete [27]. He showed that for every QMA verifier circuit C, there exists
a local Hamiltonian H(C) (called the Feynman-Kitaev Hamiltonian) such that all ground states of
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H(C) are history states of the circuit C. To test whether a given state |φ〉 is a history state of C,
one can sample random terms from H(C) and measure them to get an estimate of the energy of
|φ〉 with respect to H(C).
In slightly more detail, the local Hamiltonian H(C) consists of terms that can be divided into
four groups:
• Input checking terms Hin. These terms check that the initial snapshot |ψ0〉, which represents
the initial state of the QMA verifier, has all of its ancilla bits set to zero.
• Clock checking terms Hclock. These terms check that the clock register is encoded in unary.
The unary encoding is to ensure that the locality of H(C) is a fixed constant independent of
the computation.
• Propagation terms Hprop. These terms check that the history state is a uniform superposition
over snapshots |ψt〉, with |ψt〉 = gt|ψt−1〉.
• Output checking terms Hout. These terms check that at time t = T , the decision bit of the
QMA verifier is equal to |1〉 (i.e., the verifier accepted).
In [25], Ji showed that for every quantum interactive protocol Π, there is a generalized protocol
Hamiltonian H(Π) whose ground states are all history states of Π. The Hamiltonian H(Π) is essen-
tially the Feynman-Kitaev Hamiltonian corresponding to the verifier V , except if at time t in the
protocol Π, prover i is supposed to implement a unitary gt on their registers (which includes their
private registers as well as some registers used to communicate with the verifier), then there will
be a corresponding non-local propagation term
1
2
(|t− 1〉 ⊗ I − |t〉 ⊗ gt)
(
〈t− 1| ⊗ I − 〈t| ⊗ g†t
)
. (1)
This term is non-local because of the prover gate gt, which may act on a Hilbert space of unbounded
size. Other than these prover propagation terms, the rest of H(Π) corresponds to the local compu-
tations performed by the verifier V .
Suppose that one had the ability to sample random terms of H(Π) and efficiently measure a
given state with the terms. Then, by performing an energy test on a state |ψ〉, one could efficiently
determine whether the state was close to a history state that describes an accepting interaction
in the protocol Π. This appears to be a difficult task for terms like (1) when gt is a prover gate,
since this requires performing a complex non-local measurement. Furthermore, the tester would
not know what prover strategy to use.
Ji’s insight in [25] was that a tester could efficiently delegate the energy measurements to en-
tangled quantum provers. He constructs a protocol where the verifier V ′ commands the provers
to perform measurements corresponding to random terms of H(Π) on their shared state. If the
reported energy is low, then V ′ is convinced that there must exist a history state of Π that describes
an accepting interaction (and in particular, the provers share this history state).
In order to successfully command the provers, the verifier V ′ relies on a phenomena called non-
local game rigidity (also known as self-testing). Non-local games are one-round protocols between
a classical verifier and multiple entangled provers. This phenomena is best explained using the
famous CHSH game, which is a two-player game where the optimal entangled strategy succeeds
with probability ω∗(CHSH) = 12 +
1√
2
. The canonical, textbook strategy for CHSH is simple: the
two players share a maximally entangled pair of qubits, and measure their respective qubits using
the Pauli observables σX and σZ , depending on their input. The rigidity property of the CHSH
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game implies that this canonical strategy is, in some sense, unique: any optimal entangled strategy
for CHSH must be, up to a local basis change, identical to this canonical strategy. Thus we also say
that the CHSH game is a self-test for a maximally entangled pair of qubits and single-qubit Pauli
measurements for the players.
There has been extensive research on rigidity of non-local games [35, 15, 28, 12, 9, 29, 30, 13],
and many different self-tests have been developed. The non-local games used in the compression
protocols of [25, 19] are variants of the CHSH game, where the canonical optimal strategy is
roughly the following: the players share a maximally entangled state on n qubits, and their mea-
surements are tensor products of Pauli observables on a constant number of those n qubits, such
as
σX(i)⊗ σZ(j)⊗ σZ(k).
which indicates σX acting on the i’th qubit, and σZ on the j’th and k’th. This game also has the
following robust self-testing guarantee: any entangled strategy that succeeds with probability 1− ε
must be poly(ε, n)-close to the canonical strategy. Here, n is a growing parameter, whereas the
weight of the Pauli observables (i.e. the number of factors that don’t act as the identity) is at most
some constant independent of n.
For the terms of H(Π) that involve uncharacterized prover gates, the verifier V ′ simply asks
some provers to measure the observable corresponding to the prover gate. By carefully interleaving
rigidity tests with the energy tests, the verifier V ′ can ensure that the provers are performing the
desired measurements for all other terms of H(Π), and thus test if they have an accepting history
state.
1.2.2 Quantum error correction and fault tolerant verifiers
In order to describe our fault tolerant encoding of verifiers, we first discuss quantum error correc-
tion and fault tolerant quantum computation.
Quantum error correcting codes (QECCs) provide a way of encoding quantum information in a
form that is resilient to noise. Specifically, a [[n, k, d]] quantum code C encodes all k-qubit states |ψ〉
into an n-qubit state Enc(|ψ〉) such that for any quantum operation E that acts on at most (d− 1)/2
qubits, the original state |ψ〉 can be recovered from E(Enc(|ψ〉)). The parameter d is known as the
distance of the code C.
QECCs are an important component of fault tolerant quantum computation, which is a method
for performing quantum computations in a way that is resilient to noise. In a fault tolerant quantum
computation, the information |ψ〉 of a quantum computer is encoded into a state Enc(|ψ〉) using
some QECC C, and the computation operations are performed on the encoded data without ever
fully decoding the state.
For example, in many stabilizer QECCs, in order to compute Enc(g|ψ〉) for some single-qubit
Clifford gate g, it suffices to apply g transversally, i.e., apply g on every physical qubit of Enc(|ψ〉).
Transversal operations are highly desirable in fault tolerant quantum computation because they
spread errors in a controlled fashion.
Non-Clifford gates, however, do not admit a transversal encoding in most stabilizer QECCs. In
order to implement logical non-Clifford gates, one can use magic states. These are states that en-
code the behaviour of some non-Clifford gate g (such as a Toffoli gate, or a π/8 rotation), and
are prepared and encoded before the computation begins. During the fault tolerant computation,
the encoded magic states are used in gadgets that effectively apply the non-Clifford g to the en-
coded data. These gadgets only require measurements and transversal Clifford operations that are
controlled on the classical measurement outcomes.
7
We now discuss the behaviour of the verifier Venc. First, the encoded verifier spends time
manufacturing a collection of encoded ancilla states, as well as encoded magic states of some non-
Clifford gates (in our case, the Toffoli gate), using some fixed quantum error correcting code C.
We call this the Resource Generation Phase. Then, the verifier Venc simulates the execution of
V on the encoded information from the Resource Generation Phase. All Clifford operations of V
are performed transversally, and non-Clifford operations of V are performed with the help of the
encoded magic states. When interacting with the provers, the verifier Venc sends its messages in
encoded form as well – the provers are capable of decoding and re-encoding messages using the
code C.
Finally, after the finishing the simulation of V , the verifier Venc executes an Output Decoding
Phase: it performs a decoding procedure on the physical qubits corresponding to the output qubit
of V .
It is clear that the protocol executed by Venc is equivalent to the protocol executed by V . The
overhead introduced by this fault tolerant encoding is a constant factor increase in the length of
the circuit (depending on the size of the code C). The fault tolerant properties of the computation
of Venc will play a major role in our proof of zero knowledge.
1.2.3 The zero knowledge protocol, and its analysis
To distinguish between the parties of the “inner” protocol executed by Venc and the parties in the
“outer” protocol executed by VZK , we say that Venc is a verifier that interacts with a number of
provers. On the other hand, we say that VZK is a referee that interacts with a number of players.
The zero knowledge protocol executed by VZK consists of applying protocol compression to the
fault tolerant verifier Venc. The result is a MIP* protocol that checks whether the players possess a
history state of an accepting interaction with Venc and some provers.
The formal definition of the zero knowledge property requires an efficient algorithm, called
the simulator, that when given a yes instance (i.e., x ∈ L), produces an output that is identically
distributed to the transcript produced by an interaction between the referee and players following a
specified honest strategy. The interaction must be simulatable even when the referee doesn’t follow
the protocol. A cheating referee could, for instance, sample questions differently than the honest
referee, or interact with the players in a different order. The only constraint we have is that the
format of the questions, from the perspective of an individual player, must look like something the
honest referee could have sent. In particular, if a cheating referee tries to interact with an individual
player multiple times, the player would abort the protocol.
In the yes instance, the honest player strategy for VZK consists of sharing a history state |Φ〉 that
describes the referee Venc interacting with some provers and accepting with probability 1. When
the players receive a question in VZK , they either measure some Pauli observable on a constant
number of qubits of |Φ〉, or measure the observable corresponding to a prover gate. The zero
knowledge property of VZK rests on the ability to efficiently sample the outcomes of measurements
formed from any combination of local Pauli observables and prover measurements that might be
commanded by a cheating referee.
We first analyze non-adaptive referees; that is, they sample the questions to all the players first.
In the compressed protocol VZK , the honest referee asks the players to perform local measurements
corresponding to a random term in the the Hamiltonian H(Π). Thus, the support of the measure-
ments commanded by a referee (even a cheating one) can only involve a constant number of qubits
of |Φ〉. Let Ŵ denote the tuple of questions sent to the players, and let S
Ŵ
denote the registers
of |Φ〉 that are supposed to be measured. We argue that the reduced density matrix |Φ〉 on the
registers S
Ŵ
can be computed explicitly in polynomial time.
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This is where the fault tolerance properties of Venc come in. Since Venc is running a computation
on encoded information, any local view of the state of Venc in the middle of its computation should
not reveal any details about the actual information being processed. Intuitively, the purpose of a
quantum error correcting code is to conceal information from an environment that is making local
measurements. In the zero knowledge context, we can think of the cheating referee as the “noisy
environment” to Venc. Thus, the cheating referee should not be able to learn anything because it
can only access local correlations, while all the “juicy” information about Venc is encoded in global
correlations of |Φ〉.
Although this is the high level idea behind our proof, there are several challenges that need to
be overcome in order to make this argument work. First, the state of Venc is not always properly
encoded in an error correcting code: it may be in the middle of some logical operations, so there is a
risk that some information may be leaked. We argue that if the code used by Venc is simulatable (see
Section 2.2), then this cannot happen. We show that the concatenated Steane code is simulatable,
by analyzing coherent implementations of logical operations that do not reveal any information.
The next challenge is that the referee is able to perform local measurements not only on in-
termediate states of Venc during its computation, but also superpositions of them. This threatens
to circumvent the concealing properties of the error correcting code, because of the following
example: suppose that |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 are orthogonal n qubit states such that the reduced den-
sity matrix of every small-sized subset of qubits of |ψ0〉 or |ψ1〉 looks maximally mixed. However,
1√
2
(|0〉|ψ0〉+ |1〉|ψ1〉) can be distinguished from 1√2(|0〉+ |1〉)|ψ0〉 via a local measurement (namely,
an σX measurement on the first qubit). One potential worry is that |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 might represent
snapshots of the history state |Φ〉 that are separated by many time steps, and therefore a simulator
would have trouble simulating measurements on these superpositions, because it will not be able
to determine what the inner product between |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 is in general.
We argue that, because of the structure of the protocol and the honest strategy, the cheating
referee can only measure a superpositions that involve only constantly many consecutive snapshots
of Venc. From this we deduce that reduced density matrices of the superpositions can be efficiently
computed.
Another challenge involves simulating the outcomes of measuring the prover gate, which may
perform some arbitrarily complex computation. We carefully design the honest strategy for the
compressed protocol so that measurement outcomes of the prover gate are always either constant,
or an unbiased coin flip.
Finally, we argue that we can efficiently simulate the interaction of the protocol even when the
referee behaves adaptively. The simulator for the non-adaptive case actually computes the reduced
density matrix of the honest players’ state; we can perform post-selection on the density matrix at
most a polynomial number of times in order to simulate the distribution of questions and answers
between an adaptive referee and the provers.
1.3 Related work
In this section, we discuss some relevant work on quantum analogues of zero knowledge proofs.
In quantum information theory, zero knowledge proofs have been primarily studied in the con-
text of single prover quantum interactive proofs. This setting was first formalized by Watrous [39],
and has been an active area of research over the years. Various aspects of zero knowledge quantum
interactive proofs have been studied, including honest verifier models [39, 8], computational zero
knowledge proof systems for QMA [7], and more.
In the multiprover setting, Chiesa, Forbes, Gur and Spooner [10] showed that all problems in
NEXP (and thusMIP) are in PZK-MIP∗[2,poly(n)]. Their approach is considerably different of ours.
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They achieve their result by showing that model of interactive proofs called algebraic interactive
PCPs 5 can be lifted to the entangled provers setting in a way that preserves zero knowledge, and
then showing that languages in NEXP have zero knowledge algebraic interactive PCPs.
The results of [10] are, strictly speaking, incomparable to ours. We show that all languages in
MIP∗ have single-round PZK-MIP∗ protocols with four additional provers, whereas [10] show that
MIP (which is a subset ofMIP∗) have PZK-MIP∗ protocols with two provers and polynomially many
rounds. Improving our result to only two provers seems to be quite a daunting challenge, as it is
not even known how MIP∗[k] relates to MIP∗[k + 1] – it could potentially be the case that adding
more entangled provers yields a strictly larger complexity class!
Furthermore, the proof techniques of [10] are very different from ours: they heavily rely on al-
gebraic PCP techniques, as well as the analysis of the low degree test against entangled provers [31].
Our proof relies on techniques from fault tolerant quantum computing and the protocol compres-
sion procedure of [25, 19], which in turn rely heavily on self-testing and history state Hamiltonians.
Another qualitative difference between the zero knowledge protocol of [10] and ours is that
the honest prover strategy for their protocol does not require any entanglement; the provers can
behave classically. In our protocol, however, the provers are required to use entanglement; this is
what enables the class MIP∗ and PZK-MIP∗ to contain classes beyond NEXP, such as NEEXP (and
beyond).
Recently, Kinoshita [26] showed that a model of “honest-verifier” zero knowledge QMIP can be
lifted to general zero knowledge QMIP protocols. He also shows that QMIP have interactive proofs
with computational zero knowledge proofs under a computational assumption.
Coudron and Slofstra prove a similar result to [19] for multiprover proofs with commuting oper-
ator strategies, showing that this class also contains languages of arbitrarily large time complexity,
if the promise gap is allowed to be arbitrarily small [16]. Their results (achieved via a completely
different method from ours) also show that there are two-prover zero knowledge proofs for lan-
guages of arbitrarily large time complexity, albeit in the commuting operator model and with a
quantitatively worse lower bound than Corollary 3.
Finally, Cre´peau and Yang [17] refined the notion of zero knowledge, requiring the simulator to
be local, i.e., that there are non-communicating classical simulators that simulate the (joint) output
distribution of the provers. We note that our result does not fulfill this modified definition, and we
leave it as an open problem (dis)proving that all MIP∗ can be made zero knowledge in this setting.
Organization
The paper is organized as follows. We start with some preliminaries in Section 2. Then, in Section 3,
we present our transformation on MIP∗ protocols. In Section 4, we prove the zero knowledge
property of the transformed protocol. In Section 5, we prove that the concatenated Steane code is
simulatable.
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PCP is one where the committed oracle has a desired algebraic structure. We refer to [10] for an in-depth discussion of
these models.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We denote [n] as the set {1, ..., n}. We assume that all Hilbert spaces are finite-dimensional. An
n-qubit binary observable (also called a reflection) O is a Hermitian matrix with ±1 eigenvalues.
We use the terminology “quantum register” to name specific quantum systems. We use sans-serif
font to denote registers, such as A, B. For example, “register A”, to which is implicitly associated
the Hilbert space HA.
For a density matrix ρ defined on some registers R1 · · ·Rn, and a subset S of those registers, we
write TrS(ρ) to denote the partial trace of ρ over those registers in S. We write TrS(ρ) to denote
tracing out all registers of ρ except for the registers in S.
Let σI , σX , σY , σZ denote the four single-qubit Pauli observables
σI =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, σX =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, σY =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, σZ =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
.
We let Pn denote the n-qubit Pauli group, so Pn is the set of n-qubit unitariesW1⊗ · · · ⊗Wn where
Wi ∈ {±σI ,±iσI ,±σX ,±iσX ,±σY ,±iσY ,±σZ ,±iσZ}.
We use two ways of specifying a Pauli observable acting on a specific qubit.
1. Let W ∈ {I,X,Z} be a label and let R be a single-qubit register. We write σW (R) to denote
the observable σW acting on R.
2. Let R be an n-qubit register, and let i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. LetW = Xi (resp. W = Zi). We write σW
to denote the σX (resp. σZ) operator acting on the i-th qubit in R (the register R is implicit).
We also use W to label Pauli operators that have higher “weight”. For example, for W = XiZj the
operator σW denotes the tensor product σXi ⊗ σZj .
Universal set of gates A universal set of gates is {H,Λ(X),Λ2(X)}, where H is the Hadamard
gate, Λ(X) is the controlled-X gate (also known as the CNOT gate), and Λ2(X) is the Toffoli
gate [1].
2.2 Error correcting codes
Quantum error correcting codes (QECCs) provide a way of encoding quantum information in a form
that is resilient to noise. Specifically, a [[n, k]] quantum code C encodes all k-qubit states |ψ〉 into
an n-qubit state Enc(|ψ〉). We say that a [[n, k]] QECC has distance d if for any quantum operation
E that acts on at most (d− 1)/2 qubits, the original state |ψ〉 can be recovered from E(Enc(|ψ〉)). In
this case, we say that C is a [[n, k, d]] QECC.
Throughout this paper, we mostly use codes that encode 1 logical qubit into some number of
physical qubits. If Enc is the encoding map of an [[m, 1]] QECC C and |φ〉 is an n-qubit state, then
we overload notation and write Enc(|φ〉) to denote the mn qubit state obtained from applying Enc
to every qubit of |φ〉. We refer to the qubits of |φ〉 as logical qubits, and the qubits of the encoded
state Enc(|φ〉) as physical qubits. We call any state |ψ〉 in the code C a codeword.
Given two QECCs C1 and C2, the concatenated code C1 ◦ C2 is defined by setting EncC1◦C2(ρ) =
EncC2(EncC1(ρ)), i.e. to encode ρ in the concatenated code, we first encode it using C1, and then
encode every physical qubit of EncC1(ρ) using C2.
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2.2.1 Inner and outer codes
In our zero knowledge transformation, we use quantum error correcting codes in two different
ways. One use, as described in the proof overview in Section 1.2, is in the transformation from the
original MIP* verifier V to a fault-tolerant version Venc. We call the error correcting code used in
the fault tolerant construction the inner code, denoted by Cinner.
The other use of quantum error correcting codes is in the protocol compression of Venc into the
zero knowledge protocol VZK . In Section 1.2, we described the protocol VZK as testing whether
the players share a history state |Φ〉 of the protocol corresponding to Venc. Actually, the protocol
tests whether the players share an encoding of the history state. The qubits of the history state
|Φ〉 corresponding to the state of the verifier Venc are supposed to be encoded using another error
correcting code and distributed to multiple players (see Section 3.2.1 for more details). For this,
we use what we call the outer code, denoted by Couter.
The outer code For the outer code Couter, we require a stabilizer code that satisfies the following
properties [19]:
1. For every qubit i, there exists a logical X and Z operator that acts trivially on that qubit.
2. The code can correct one erasure in a known location.
The following four-qubit error detection code satisfies both properties [23].
|0〉 7→ 1√
2
(|0000〉 + |1111〉) |1〉 7→ 1√
2
(|1001〉 + |0110〉) .
The stabilizer generators for this code are XXXX,ZIIZ, IZZI. A set of logical operators for this
code are XIIX, IXXI,ZZII, IIZZ. We use Encouter to denote the encoding map for the outer
code Couter.
The inner code For the inner code Cinner, we use the concatenated Steane code SteaneK for some
sufficiently large (but constant) K. We use Encinner to denote the encoding map for the outer code
Cinner. We describe the concatenated Steane code in more detail in Section 5.5.1.
2.2.2 Encodings of gates and simulatable codes
An important concept in our work is that of simulatable codes. The motivation for this concept is
the observation that for a distance d code C, the reduced density matrix of any codeword |ψ〉 ∈ C
on fewer than d − 1 qubits is a state that is independent of |ψ〉, and only depends on the code
C. We generalize this indistinguishability notion to the context of fault tolerant encodings of gates
with a QECC: informally, a QECC is simulatable if “small width” reduced density matrices of code-
words |ψ〉 in the middle of a logical operation are independent of |ψ〉. Intuitively, simulatability
is a necessary condition for fault tolerant quantum computation; if local views of an in-progress
quantum computation are dependent on the logical data, then environmental noise can corrupt the
computation.
Let U be a k-qubit gate. If a = (a1, . . . , ak) is a k-tuple of distinct numbers between 1 and n, we
let U(a) be the gate U applied to qubits (a1, . . . , ak). If ρ is an n-qubit state, then U(a)ρU(a)
† is the
result of applying U to ρ in qubits a1, . . . , ak.
An encoding of a k-qubit gate U in the code C is a way to transform Enc(ρ) to Enc(U(a)ρU(a)†)
by applying operations on the physical qubits, sometimes with an additional ancilla state used as
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a resource. More formally, an encoding of a k-qubit U in code C is a pair of states σU and σ′U , and
a number ℓ ≥ 1, along with a mapping from k-tuples a of distinct physical qubits to sequences of
unitaries O1(a), . . . , Oℓ(a) such that
(Oℓ(a) · · ·O1(a)) (Enc(ρ)⊗ σU ) (Oℓ(a) · · ·O1(a))† = Enc(U(a)ρU(a)†)⊗ σ′U ,
where (in a slight abuse of notation) the unitaries O1(a), . . . , Oℓ(a) act only on the physical qubits
corresponding to logical qubits a1, . . . , ak, as well as the ancilla register holding σU . In this defini-
tion, the sequence O1(a), . . . , Oℓ(a) depends on a. However, in practice a is only used to determine
which physical qubits the gatesO1(a), . . . , Oℓ(a) act on, and otherwise the sequence depends strictly
on U . We say that an encoding uses physical gates G if for every a, the unitaries O1(a), . . . , Oℓ(a)
are gates in G.
If a QECC C can correct arbitrary errors on s qubits, then the partial trace TrS(Enc(ρ)) is inde-
pendent of the state ρ for every set of physical qubits S with |S| ≤ s. If we start with an encoded
state Enc(ρ), and apply an encoded logical operation U to some k-tuple of qubits a, then we start
in state Enc(ρ) ⊗ σU and end in state Enc(U(a)ρU(a)†) ⊗ σ′U . So as long as we can compute the
partial traces of σU and σ
′
U , then we can compute TrS(Enc(ρ)) both before and after the operation.
However, the encoded operation is made of up a sequence of gates, and while we are in the middle
of applying these gates, the system might not be in an encoded state. We say that an encoding is
s-simulatable if we can still compute the reduced density matrices on up to s qubits of the state at
any point during the encoding of U . The following definition formalizes this notion:
Definition 5. An encoding (σU , σ
′
U , ℓ, O1(a), . . . , Oℓ(a)) of a k-qubit gate in a QECC C is s-simulatable
if for all integers 0 ≤ t ≤ ℓ, n-qubit states ρ, and subsets S of the physical qubits of Enc(ρ) ⊗ σU with
|S| ≤ s, the partial trace
TrS((Ot(a) · · ·O1(a))Enc(ρ)⊗ σU (Ot(a) · · ·O1(a))†)
can be computed in polynomial time from t, a, and S. In particular, the partial trace is independent of
ρ.
In our applications, s will be constant. We also consider only a finite number of gates U , and
since t is bounded in any given encoding, t will also be constant. The partial trace in the above
definition will be a 2|S| × 2|S| matrix, where |S| ≤ s. So when we say that the partial trace can be
computed in polynomial time in Definition 5, we mean that the entries of this matrix are rational,
and can be computed explicitly in polynomial time from a, S, and t.
A crucial component of our zero knowledge arguments is the notion of simulatable codes. We
state now the theorem we will use to prove zero knowledge. The proof is deferred to Section 5.
Theorem 6. Let U = {H,Λ(X),Λ2(X)}. For every constant s, there exists a [[n, 1]] QECC C where n
is constant, such that C has s-simulatable encodings of U using only U as physical gates.
If a code C admits a simulatable encoding of a gate U , then, applying Definition 5 with t = 0,
we see that it must be possible to compute the partial trace TrS(Enc(ρ)⊗σU ) for any set of physical
qubits S with |S| ≤ s, with no knowledge of ρ. In particular, it must be possible to compute partial
traces of Enc(ρ) on all but s qubits. We must also be able to compute the partial traces of the ancilla
states σU and (setting t = ℓ) σ
′
U , although this is easier in principle, since we have full knowledge
of these states.
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2.3 Quantum interactive protocols
We first define the notion of a protocol circuit, which is a quantum circuit representation an inter-
action between a quantum verifier and one or more provers. A protocol circuit C with k provers
and r rounds is specified by a tuple (n,m,Γ) where n,m are positive integers and Γ is a sequence
of gates (g1, g2, . . .). This tuple is interpreted in the following manner. The circuit C acts on these
registers:
1. A set of prover registers P1, . . . ,Pk.
2. A set of message registers M1, . . . ,Mk; each register Mi consists of m qubits. The j’th qubit of
register Mi is denoted by Mij.
3. A verifier register V which consists of n qubits. The j’th qubit of register V is denoted by Vj.
Each gate gi consists of a gate type, and the label of the registers that the gate acts on. There are
two gate types:
1. A gate from a universal gate set (such as Hadamard, CNOT, and Toffoli), which can only act
on registers V,M1, . . . ,Mk.
2. A prover gate Pij , which represents the i’th prover’s unitary in round j. The prover gate Pij
can only act on registers PiMi.
Furthermore, prover i’s gates {Pij} must appear in order; for example, Pi2 can only appear in the
circuit after Pi1 has appeared. A prover gate Pij cannot appear twice in the circuit with the same
label.
Intuitively, a protocol circuit describes an interaction between a verifier and k provers where the
verifier performs a computation on the workspace register V, and communicates with the provers
through the message registers {Mi}, and the provers carry out their computations on the registers
{PiMi}. The verifier’s workspace V is initialized in the all zeroes state, and the {PiMi} registers are
initialized in some entangled state |ψ〉 chosen by the provers. At the end of the protocol circuit, the
first qubit of the workspace register V is measured in the standard basis to determine whether the
verifier accepts or rejects.
A prover strategy S for a protocol circuit C is specified by a tuple (d, {Pij}, |ψ〉) where d is
a positive integer, a set of unitary operators Pij for i = 1, . . . , k and j = 1, . . . , r that act on
C
d ⊗ (C2)⊗m, and pure states |ψ〉 in (Cd)⊗k ⊗ (C2)⊗mk. Given a protocol circuit C, we write ω∗(C)
to denote the supremum of acceptance probabilities of the verifier over all possible prover strategies
S.
We now define the complexity class QMIP, which stands for quantum multiprover interactive
proofs. This is the set of all languages L that can be decided by a quantum interactive protocol
with at most polynomially many provers, at most polynomially-many rounds, and polynomial-sized
protocol circuits, whose gates are drawn from the gate set {H,Λ(X),Λ2(X)}.
Definition 7. A promise problem L = (Lyes, Lno) is in the complexity class QMIPc,s[k, r] if and only
if there exists a polynomial-time computable function V with the following properties:
1. For every x ∈ Lyes∪Lno, the output of V on input x is a description of a k-prover, r-round prover
circuit V (x) = (n,m,Γ) where n,m = poly(|x|).
2. Completeness. For every x ∈ Lyes, it holds that ω∗(V (x)) ≥ c.
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3. Soundness. For every x ∈ Lno, it holds that ω∗(V (x)) < s.
Furthermore, we say that L has a QMIPc,s[k, r] protocol V .
Throughout this paper, we interchangeably refer to V (x) as the protocol circuit, the protocol,
or the verifier that is executing the protocol, depending on the context.
We note that in the negative case (i.e. x ∈ Lno), we require that the entangled value of V (x)
is strictly less than s. This allows us to meaningfully talk about “zero promise gap” classes such as
QMIP1,1[k, r], where in the Completeness case, the verifier has to accept with probability 1, whereas
in the Soundness case, the verifier has to reject with some positive probability. Finally, we follow
the convention that QMIP[k, r] is defined as QMIP2
3
, 1
3
[k, r].
We also define the class MIP∗, which is defined in the same way as QMIP except that the proto-
col is specified as a classical interaction between a randomized verifier (modelled as a probabilistic
polynomial-time Turing machine) and quantum provers. Since the verifier is classical, the com-
munication between the verifier and provers can be treated as classical. Thus, in a k-prover MIP∗
protocol, we can equivalently talk aboutmeasurement prover strategies S, where the k provers share
an entangled state |ψ〉 ∈ H⊗k for some Hilbert space H. In each round of the protocol, each prover
receives a classical message from the verifier, and performs a measurement on their share of |ψ〉
that depends on the verifier’s message as well as the previous messages exchanged between that
prover and the verifier (but not the communication with the other provers).
We call prover strategies for a general QMIP protocol as unitary strategies, to distinguish them
from measurement strategies forMIP∗ protocols. Furthermore, when we speak of anMIP∗ protocol
V , we are referring to the verifier for the protocol (which is some probabilistic Turing machine).
2.4 Zero knowledge MIP∗
First, we define the view of an interaction between a classical, randomized verifier V̂ and a set of k
provers that behave according to some strategy S, as might occur in anMIP∗ protocol. The view is a
random variable View(V̂ (x)↔ S) which is the tuple (x, r,m1,m2, . . . ,m2r) where x is the input to
V̂ , r is the randomness used by V̂ , and the mi’s are the messages between the provers and verifier.
Next, we present the definition of zero knowledgeMIP∗ protocols, first defined by [11]. We use
the abbreviation “PPT” to denote “probabilistic polynomial-time.”
Definition 8. An MIP∗c,s[k, r] protocol V for a promise language L = (Lyes, Lno) is statistically zero
knowledge if for all x ∈ Lyes, there exists a prover strategy S (called the honest strategy) satisfying
the following properties:
1. The strategy S is accepted by the protocol V (x) with probability at least c,
2. For all PPT verifiers V̂ , there exists a PPT simulator SimV̂ such that the output distribution
of SimV̂ (x) is ε(n)-close in total variation distance to View(V̂ (x) ↔ S), for some negligible
function ε(n).
Furthermore, the complexity class SZK-MIP∗c,s[k, r] is the set of languages that have statistical zero
knowledge proof systems.
When a language can be decided by a zero knowledge proof system with closeness ε(n) = 0,
we say that it admits a perfect zero knowledge proof system. In other words, the interaction can
be simulated exactly. We let PZK-MIP∗c,s[k, r] denote languages that admit perfect zero knowledge
MIP∗ protocols.
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Some subtleties We address two subtleties regarding the definitions of QMIP and PZK-MIP∗.
1. The definition of QMIP depends on our choice of gate set. If we allow the verifier circuits to
use arbitrary single- and two-qubit gates, then our perfect zero knowledge results may not
hold; however, we will still get the statistical zero knowledge property with exponentially
small error.
2. In a PZK-MIP∗c,s[k, r] protocol V , there may be no strategy S for the provers that gets accepted
with probability c exactly. Instead, there may be a sequence of strategies whose success
probability converges to c. Thus, in order for PZK-MIP∗c,s[k, r] to be correctly defined, we
require that there exists a sequence of honest strategies S1,S2, . . . satisfying:
• The success probability of Si approaches c as i→∞, and
• For all verifiers V̂ , there exists a simulator SimV̂ whose output distribution can be ap-
proximated arbitrarily well by the sequence of honest strategies. In other words, for all
δ there exists an i such that the total variation distance between View(V̂ (x) ↔ Si) and
SimV̂ is at most δ.
This subtlety only arises when considering “zero gap” classes such as PZK-MIP∗1,1[k, r].
2.5 Parallel repetition
Parallel repetition of interactive protocols is a commonly used technique for performing gap ampli-
fication. We now define what this means for 1-round MIP∗ protocols.
Definition 9 (Parallel repetition of a one-round MIP∗ protocol). Let V denote a 1-round, k-prover
MIP∗ protocol. The m-fold parallel repetition of V is another 1-round, k-prover MIP∗ protocol V m
where m independent instances of V are executed simultaneously. Let qij denote the questions from
instance i to prover j. Then prover j receives (q1j, q2j , . . . , qmj) simultaneously, and responds with
answers (a1j , a2j , . . . , anj). The answers (ai1, ai2, . . . , aik) is then given to the i’th verifier instance,
and V m accepts if and only if all instances accept.
The behaviour of ω∗(V m) as a function of n and ω∗(V ) < 1 is non-trivial; clearly, if ω∗(V ) = 1,
then ω∗(V m) = 1 as well. Although one might expect that ω∗(V m) decays exponentially with m
in the case that ω∗(V ) < 1, this is not known in general. Raz [34] showed that such exponential
decay does hold for classical 1-round, 2-prover MIP proof systems, but extending this to the case of
more provers orMIP∗ proof systems has remained an active area of research. It is an open question
for whether the analogue of Raz’s result holds for MIP∗ protocols (although a polynomial-decay
bound is known [40]).
Bavarian, Vidick, and Yuen [3] showed that an exponential-decay parallel repetition theorem
also holds for 1-round MIP∗ protocols that have the property of being anchored, and furthermore,
every 1-roundMIP∗ protocol can be transformed into an equivalent anchored protocol. Their result
has the additional benefit in that it holds for any number of provers.
We do not formally define the anchoring property here, but instead we describe a simple trans-
formation to anchor any 1-round MIP∗ protocol.
Definition 10 (Anchoring). Let α > 0 be some constant. Given a 1-round, k-prover MIP∗ protocol V ,
define its α-anchored version V⊥ to be the protocol which:
1. Runs the verifier in V to obtain questions (q1, . . . , qk) for the k provers.
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2. Independently choose each coordinate i with probability α and replace qi with an auxiliary ques-
tion symbol ⊥, and send the questions to each prover.
3. If any prover received the auxiliary question ⊥, automatically accept. Otherwise, accept the
provers’ answers only if V would have accepted.
This transformation preserves completeness and soundness: ω∗(V ) = 1 if and only if ω∗(V⊥) =
1. In general, we have the relationship
ω∗(V⊥) = (1− α)kω∗(V ) + (1− (1− α)k).
Bavarian, Vidick and Yuen [3] showed the parallel repetition of anchored games admits an expo-
nential decay in success probability.
Theorem 11. Let α > 0. Let V be a 1-round, k-prover MIP∗ protocol. Let V⊥ be the α-anchored
version of V as defined in Definition 10. Let m > 0 be an integer. If ω∗(V ) = 1, then ω∗(V m⊥ ) = 1.
Otherwise,
ω∗(V m⊥ ) ≤ exp(−βεγm)
where β is a universal constant depending on α and the protocol V , ε is defined as 1 − ω∗(V ), and γ
is a universal constant.
3 Our zero knowledge protocol
In this section we present the zero knowledge transformation for general MIP∗ protocols. For
convenience we reproduce the statement of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. For all 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, for all polynomially bounded functions k, r,
MIP∗1,s[k, r] ⊆ PZK-MIP∗1,s′ [k + 4, 1]
where s′ = 1− (1− s)α for some universal constant α > 0.
Fix a promise language L ∈ MIP∗1,s[k, r]. There exists a polynomial-time computable function
V that on input x outputs a k-prover, 1-round protocol circuit V (x) such that if x ∈ L, then
ω∗(V (x)) = 1, and otherwise ω∗(V (x)) < s. Furthermore, since we are dealing with an MIP∗
proof system, the communication between the verifier and the provers is classical. Thus, we can
assume that the protocol circuit V has the following structure. All qubits of the verifier register V
are initialized to |0〉. The protocol circuit proceeds in five phases:
• Verifier Operation Phase 1: All computation in this phase of the protocol occurs on the
verifier register V. At the end of the computation, the verifier’s messages to the i’th prover
are stored in a subregister Ni of V.
• Copy Question Phase: For each prover i, CNOT gates are applied bitwise from Ni to bits in
the register Mi.
• Prover Operation Phase: Each prover i applies prover gate Pi to registers PiMi, in sequence.
• Copy Answer Phase: For each prover i, CNOT gates are applied bitwise from Mi to bits in
the register Ni.
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• Verifier Operation Phase 2: The remaining computation in the protocol occurs on the verifier
register V, and the accept/reject decision bit is stored in a designated output qubit of V.
As mentioned earlier, we assume that the non-prover gates of the protocol circuit V (x) are drawn
from the universal gate set {H,Λ(X),Λ2(X)}. Figure 1 gives a diagrammatic representation of this
five-phase structure, depicting a protocol in which a verifier interacts with a single prover.
V
N
P
M
V1
P
V2
Figure 1: A quantum circuit representation of an MIP* protocol
As described in the Introduction, we first transform the protocol circuit V (x) into an equivalent
protocol circuit Venc(x) that performs its computations fault-tolerantly. Then, we use the compres-
sion techniques of [25, 19] on the protocol defined by Venc(x) to obtain a protocol VZK(x) which
has the desired zero knowledge properties.
3.1 Robustifying protocol circuits
We now describe a polynomial-time transformation that takes as input the description of a k-prover,
1-round MIP∗ protocol circuit such as V described above, and outputs another k-prover, 1-round
protocol circuit Venc that describes an equivalent MIP
∗ protocol, but has additional fault-tolerance
properties.
The non-prover gates of Venc are drawn from the universal gate set {H ⊗ H,Λ(X),Λ2(X)}.6
The registers that are involved in the protocol Venc are {P1, . . . ,Pk,M1, . . . ,Mk,V}. The verifier
workspace register V can be subdivided into registers A, B, O, and N1, . . . ,Nk. Intuitively, the
register A holds encoded qubits, the register B holds unencoded qubits, the register O holds an
encoding of the output bit at the end of the protocol, and the register Ni is isomorphic to Mi for all
i.
Let the inner code Cinner be a 192-simulatable code. We remark that from Theorem 6, such
codes exist and each logical qubit is encoded in m physical bits, for some constant m.
At the beginning of the protocol Venc, the qubits in register V are initialized to zero. In addition
to the five phases of V , there are two additional phases in Venc. First, the protocol Venc goes
through a Resource Generation Phase, in which the verifier generates many Cinner encodings of
the following states in its private workspace:
1. Toffoli magic states |Toffoli〉 = Λ2(X)(H ⊗H ⊗ I)|0, 0, 0〉.
2. Ancilla |0〉 qubits.
6The doubled Hadamard gate is used for technical reasons; the second Hadamard gate can always be applied to
unused ancilla qubits if it is not needed.
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3. Ancilla |1〉 qubits.
Thus the state of the register V after the Resource Generation Phase will be a tensor product of
encoded magic states, encoded |0〉 states, encoded |1〉 states, and unencoded |0〉 states.
Now the the verifier of Venc simulates the five computational phases of V , but as logical oper-
ations acting on data encoded using the inner code Cinner. For the Verifier Operation Phases and
the Copy Question/Answer Phases, each non-prover gate gi ∈ {H,Λ(X),Λ2(X)} of V is replaced
in Venc with the encoding of gi using the Cinner, as given by Theorem 6. For example, if gi in V is a
Hadamard gate that acts on some qubit α of V, then its equivalent will be a sequence of (double)
Hadamard gates acting transversally on the physical qubits of the encoding of qubit α. If gi in V
is a Toffoli gate, then in Venc the logical gate is applied using the Toffoli gadget (as described in
Section 5). Thus, all of the gates of the verifier in V are performed in an encoded manner in Venc.
The Prover Operation Phase proceeds as before; each prover applies their prover gate on the
MP registers in sequence. We assume that the Prover Operation Phase is padded with sufficiently
many identity gates so that the number of time steps in between each prover gate application is at
some sufficiently large constant times the block length of the inner code Cinner.
Note that the questions to the provers are encoded using the inner code Cinner; this is not a
problem for the provers, who can decode the questions before performing their original strategy,
and encode their answers afterwards.
Finally, we assume that at the end of the (encoded) Verifier Operation Phase 2, the register O
stores the logical encoding of the accept/reject decision bit. After Verifier Operation Phase 2, the
protocol Venc executes the Output Decoding Phase, where the logical state in register O is decoded
(using the decoder from Cinner) into a single physical qubit Oout.
It is easy to see that this transformation from V to Venc preserves the acceptance probability of
the protocol.
Proposition 12. For all 1-round MIP∗ protocols V , for the MIP∗ protocol Venc that is the result of the
transformation just described, we have that
ω∗(V ) = ω∗(Venc).
3.1.1 Micro-phases of Venc
We assume the following structural format to the protocol circuit Venc: aside from the major phases
of Venc, we can partition the timesteps of the circuit into “micro-phases”, where each micro-phase
consists of a constant number of consecutive timesteps, and each micro-phase can be classified
according to the operations performed within it:
• Idling: the gates applied by the verifier during this micro-phase are all identity gates.
• Resource encoding: gates are applied to a collection of ancilla |0〉 qubits to form either an
encoding of a |0〉 state, |1〉 state, or a Toffoli magic state.
• Logical operation: the encoding of a single logical gate is being applied to some encoded
blocks of qubits, possibly along with some unencoded ancilla qubits.
• Output decoding: the output register O of the verifier circuit is decoded to obtain a single
qubit answer. This is exactly the Output Decoding phase.
For example, the Resource Generation phase consists of a sequence of resource encoding micro-
phases, applied to blocks of ancilla qubits. The Verifier Operation phases consist of sequences of
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both idling steps and logical operations, applied to blocks of encoded qubits as well as ancilla qubits.
The timesteps during the Prover Operation phase are classified as idling steps, because the verifier
is not applying any gates to its private space.
3.1.2 Prover reflection times
Given the protocol circuit Venc of length T , we identify special timesteps during the protocol corre-
sponding to the timesteps where the provers apply their prover gate. For every prover i, we define
t⋆(i) ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , T} to be the time in the protocol circuit when prover i applies their prover gate
Pi.
3.2 A zero knowledge MIP∗ protocol to decide L
Given the transformation from an MIP∗ protocol V to an equivalent “fault-tolerant” protocol Venc,
we now introduce a second transformation that takes Venc and produces another equivalent MIP
∗
protocol VZK that has the desired zero knowledge properties.
This protocol is obtained by applying the compression procedure of [25, 19] to Venc. Since
we are compressing interactive protocols (involving verifiers and provers) into other interactive
protocols, to keep things clear we use the following naming convention:
• Verifiers and provers refer to the parties in Venc (i.e. the protocol that is being compressed);
• Referees and players refer to the parties in VZK (i.e. the protocol that is the result of the
compression scheme).
At a high level, the protocol VZK is designed to verify that the players possess (an encoding of)
a history state of the protocol Venc:
|Φ〉CVMP = 1√
T + 1
T∑
t=0
|unary(t)〉C ⊗ |Φt〉VMP (2)
where T is the number of gates of Venc, unary(t) = t1t2 · · · tT denotes the unary encoding of time t,
i.e.
tℓ =
{
1 if ℓ ≤ t
0 otherwise
,
and |Φt〉 is the state of the protocol Venc after t time steps (called the t’th snapshot state).
We specify some details of the protocol VZK:
• Rounds: 1-round protocol
• Number of players: k + 4 players, which are are divided into k prover players (labelled
PP1, . . . , PPk) and 4 verifier players (labelled PV1, . . . , PV4).
• Question and answer format: questions to the verifier players are 6-tuples of the form
(W1, . . . ,W6), where each Wi denotes a two-qubit Pauli observable on some specified pair of
qubits, and the six observables commute. Furthermore, the Pauli observables are tensor prod-
ucts of operators from the set {I,X,Z}. An example of a question would be: (X1X2, Z1Z2, I7Z5,X3Z4, Z3X4,X7I5).
Verifier players’ answers are a 6-tuple of bits (a1, . . . , a6).
Questions to prover player PPi can be one of three types:
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1. Prover reflection, denoted by ⋆i.
2. Question gates, denoted by Qij for j = 1, . . . ,m
′, where m′ is the maximum number of
qubits in the message registers {Mi} in the protocol Venc.
3. Question flag flip, denoted by QFi.
4. Answer gates, denoted by Aij for j = 1, . . . ,m
′.
5. Answer flag flip, denoted by AFi.
We notice that even if the Prover players’ original answers consisted of a single bit, after
robustifying the protocol circuits, the answers become an encoding of the logical bit.
The distribution of questions and the rules used by the referee in VZK are essentially identical
to the ones used in the compression protocol in [19].7 Given those, the results of [19] show that
VZK is a complete and sound MIP
∗ proof system for L:
L ∈ MIP∗1,s′ [k + 4, 1]
where s′ = (1− s)β/p(n) for some universal constant β and some polynomial p(n) that depends on
the original protocol V , and s is the soundness of V .
The details of the the question distribution, the rules and the soundness analysis are irrelevant
for this paper, as we are only concerned with establishing the zero knowledge property of VZK . For
this, we only need to consider the interaction between honest players and a potentially cheating
referee R̂.
3.2.1 An honest strategy SZK for VZK
We now specify an honest strategy SZK(x) for the players in VZK(x) in the case that x ∈ Lyes.
Since x ∈ Lyes, by definition we have that ω∗(V (x)) = 1, and therefore by Proposition 12 we get
ω∗(Venc(x)) = 1. Thus there exists a sequence of finite dimensional unitary strategies {S1(x),S2(x), . . .}
for Venc(x) such that the acceptance probability approaches 1. For simplicity, we assume that there
exists a finite dimensional unitary strategy S(x) for Venc(x) that is accepted with probability 1; in
the general case, we can take a limit and our conclusions still hold.
The strategy S(x) consists of a dimension d, an entangled state |ψ〉 on registers P1, . . . ,Pk and
M1, . . . ,Mk (where the registers Pi have dimension d), and a collection of unitaries {Pi} where
Pi acts on registers PiMi. We assume, without loss of generality, that in under the strategy S in
protocol Venc(x), the state of the message registers {Mi}i are in the code subspace of Cinner at each
time step of the protocol (where we treat the prover operations as taking one time step).
Given this, we define the measurement8 strategy SZK(x) in the following way. For notational
simplicity, we omit mention of the input x when it is clear from context.
The shared entanglement Let |Φ〉CVMP denote the history state of the protocol Venc(x) when the
provers use strategy S (as in (2)). The initial state |Φ0〉 is |0〉V ⊗ |ψ〉MP.
7The main difference concerns the questions “Question flag flip” and “Answer flag flip” to the provers, which do not
occur in [25, 19]. These will be helpful for the analysis of zero knowledge property. We explain in Appendix A the slight
modifications to the protocol from [19] that are needed.
8Since the protocols V and Venc are general QMIP protocols, the strategy S is a unitary strategy. Since VZK is aMIP
∗
protocol, we specify SZK as a measurement strategy.
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We now construct an distributed history state |Φ′〉C′V′MPF from |Φ〉 in two steps. First, without
loss of generality we augment a k-partite register F = F1, . . . ,Fk to |Φ〉 so that serves as flags that
indicate which operations the i’th prover has applied. Thus the augmented history state looks like
|Φ〉 = 1√
T + 1
T∑
t=0
|unary(t)〉C ⊗ |∆t〉VMP ⊗ |f(t)〉F
where |f(t)〉F =
⊗
i|fi(t)〉Fi and |fi(t)〉Fi = |qi(t)〉FQi⊗|pi(t)〉FPi⊗|ai(t)〉FAi . For all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k},
the functions qi(t), pi(t), ai(t) are boolean functions of the time t, defined as follows:
qi(t) =
{
1 if t ≥ t⋆(i)− 1
0 otherwise
,
pi(t) =
{
1 if t ≥ t⋆(i)
0 otherwise
,
and
ai(t) =
{
1 if t ≥ t⋆(i) + 1
0 otherwise
.
The flags qi, pi, ai flip from 0 to 1 consecutively: at time t = t⋆(i)− 2, all flags for player i are set to
0. By the time t = t⋆(i) + 1, all flags for player i are set to 1.
Next, we perform a qubit-by-qubit encoding of the C and V registers of |Φ〉 using the outer code
Couter, to obtain the encoded history state |Φ′〉 defined on registers C′,V′,M,P. Each qubit of C and
V are encoded into 4 physical qubits.
The allocation of the registers of |Φ′〉 to the k + 4 players are as follows:
1. The register C consists of T qubits. For i = 1, . . . , T , let Ci denote the i’th qubit register of C.
For j = 1, . . . , 4, let C′ij denote the j’th share of the Couter encoding of Ci. In the honest case,
the j’th verifier player PVj has the qubits {C′ij}i.
2. Similarly, the registers V′ij denote the j’th share of the encoding of the register Vi; the sub-
registers Ai,Bi,Oi,Ni of V are encoded into subregisters A
′
ij,B
′
ij ,O
′
ij,N
′
ij of V
′ respectively. In
the honest case, the j’th verifier player PVj holds qubits {V′ij}i.
3. The prover players’ {PP1, . . . , PPk} represent the original k players of the protocol V and
Venc. In the honest case, prover player PPi holds registers {FiPiMi}. Note that these registers
are not encoded and split up like with the clock and verifier registers.
Player measurements Since VZK is a 1-round MIP
∗ protocol, we specify the strategy SZK in
terms of measurement operators.
• When the verifier players receive a 6-tuple of commuting Pauli observables (W1, . . . ,W6), they
measure each of the observables σW1 , . . . , σW6 in sequence on the designated qubits of their
share of |Φ′〉, and report the measurement outcomes (a1, . . . , a6). For example, ifW1 = X1Z2,
then the corresponding observable would be σX ⊗ σZ acting on qubits labelled 1 and 2.
• When prover player PPi receives a prover reflection question ⋆i, they measure the following
observable on the registers FPiPiMi:
P ′i = |0〉〈1|FPi ⊗ P
†
i + |1〉〈0|FPi ⊗ Pi
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where Pi acts on PiMi. It is easy to see that P
′
i is an observable with a +1 eigenspace and a
−1 eigenspace.
• When prover player PPi receives a “Question gate” questionQij, they measure the observable
σX on the register Mij, and report the one-bit answer. When PPi receives an “Answer gate”
question Aij , they measure the observable σZ on the register Mij, and report the one-bit
answer.
• When prover player PPi receives the “Question flag flip” question QFi, they measure the
observable σX on the register FQi . When they receive “Answer flag flip” question AFi, they
measure the observable σX on the register FAi .
The analysis of the compression protocol in [19] implies that the strategy SZK(x) is accepted
in the protocol VZK(x) with probability 1. We now proceed to argue the zero knowledge property
of the protocol VZK with the honest player strategy SZK .
Notation Meaning
Venc The fault tolerant encoding of the original protocol V
k Number of provers in the protocol Venc
VZK The zero knowledge protocol
NV Number of verifier players in VZK , which is 4.
t⋆(i) The time that prover i applies prover reflection P
′
i .
qi(t) Indicator function that is 1 iff t ≥ t⋆(i) − 1. Used as a flag to indicate
whether the questions for the i’th prover have been all copied.
pi(t) Indicator function that is 1 iff t ≥ t⋆(i). Used as a flag to indicate
whether the i’th prover has applied its reflection P ′i .
ai(t) Indicator function that is 1 iff t ≥ t⋆(i) + 1. Used as a flag to indicate
whether the i’th prover is ready to copy its answers to the verifier.
SZK The honest player strategy for VZK
|Φ〉 The unencoded history state of an interaction in the protocol Venc
|ΦI 〉 The restriction of the history state |Φ〉 to a time interval I
P ′i The prover reflection used by prover player PPi in SZK
R̂ A (possibly cheating) referee in the protocol VZK
Ŵ A tuple of questions in VZK , or the associated observable measured by
the players in SZK .
Ŵ (V,r), Ŵ (P,r) Questions to the r’th verifier and prover players, respectively.
W˜ (V,r), W˜ (P,r) Players’ measurement observables without the prover reflections
L This is the number of verifier player qubits that can be addressed by a
question Ŵ . This is 12NV = 48, which is a constant.
Figure 2: Notation reference
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4 Zero knowledge property of VZK
Let R̂(x) be an arbitrary referee (modelled as a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine)
interacting with k provers that use the measurement strategy SZK(x) defined above. In general,
this referee R̂(x) may try to gain forbidden knowledge by deviating from the behaviour of the
referee specified by the protocol VZK . In this section, we show this cannot happen by describing
an efficient simulator Sim(x) whose output distribution is equal to View(R̂(x)↔ SZK(x)).
A referee R̂ could try to cheat by sampling questions from a different distribution than the one
that is specified in the VZK protocol. Furthermore, the referee could interact with the provers adap-
tively: it could send some messages to a subset of the provers, get some answers, and depending
on those responses choose questions for another set of provers. We can assume that a cheating ref-
eree does not interact with the same prover in VZK twice; since the protocol is supposed to be one
round, an honest prover would abort the protocol if the referee interacted with it multiple times.
Similarly, we assume that a cheating referee only asks questions that match the format of questions
in VZK .
In Section Section 4.1, we show how to simulate the interaction between R̂ and the players
when R̂ is non-adaptive, meaning that the questions for all players are picked simultaneously by
the referee before interacting with them. In Section 4.2 we show how to perform this simulation
for general adaptive referees R̂.
For the remainder of this section, we omit mention of the input x; we assume that the referee
R̂ and the strategy SZK implicitly depend on x.
We introduce some additional notation.
• Let NV = 4, NP = k denote the number of verifier players and prover players, respectively.
• Let Ŵ (V,r), and Ŵ (P,r) denote the question for the r’th verifier player and r’th prover player
respectively. The question Ŵ (V,r) is a 6-tuple (Ŵ
(V,r)
1 , . . . , Ŵ
(V,r)
6 ) of commuting two-qubit
Pauli observables.
• For r ∈ [NV ], for j ∈ {1, . . . , 6}, we overload notation by also letting Ŵ (V,r)j denote the j’th
Pauli observable used by r’th verifier player in the honest strategy SZK when they receive
question Ŵ (V,r) , as specified in Section 3.2.1. We also let Ŵ (V,r) denote the observable that
is the product Ŵ
(V,r)
1 · · · Ŵ (V,r)6 (the order does not matter because the observables commute).
Whether or not Ŵ
(V,r)
j and Ŵ
(V,r) are used to refer to the question or the observables will be
clear from context.
• For r ∈ [NP ], we let Ŵ (P,r) also denote the observable used by prover player PPr in the
honest strategy SZK when they receive question Ŵ (P,r). For example, if Ŵ (P,r) is a “Question
gate” Qrj or a “Question flag flip” QFr, then as an observable we interpret Ŵ
(P,r) as the
corresponding Pauli observable in the honest strategy SZK . If Ŵ (P,r) is a prover reflection ⋆r,
then as an observable we interpret Ŵ (P,r) as P ′r.
• Let Ŵ =
(
Ŵ (D,r)
)
D∈{V,P},r∈[ND]
denote the tuple of questions for all players in the protocol.
We also use Ŵ to denote the tensor product of observables
Ŵ =
⊗
D∈{V,P},r∈[ND]
Ŵ (D,r).
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• For r ∈ [NV ], j ∈ {1, . . . , 6}, we define the observable W˜ (V,r)j to be Ŵ (V,r)j . For r ∈ [NP ], we
define the observable
W˜ (P,r) =
{
σX(FPr) if Ŵ
(P,r) = ⋆r
Ŵ (P,r) otherwise
Notice that the observables W˜ (D,r) are simply Pauli observables (or products of Pauli observ-
ables). We explain the reasoning behind defining the observables W˜ (D,r) in the next section.
• We also define the projectors corresponding to the players’ observables. The verifier players
output a 6-tuple of bits (b1, . . . , b6) ∈ {0, 1}6. For r ∈ [NV ], j ∈ {1, . . . , 6}, and bit b ∈ {0, 1},
define
Ŵ
(V,r)
j (b) =
1
2
(
I + (−1)bŴ (V,r)j
)
which is the projector onto the b subspace of Ŵ
(V,r)
j . Define
Ŵ (V,r)(b1, . . . , b6) =
6∏
i=1
Ŵ
(V,r)
i (bi).
The prover players only output a single bit, so for r ∈ [NP ], define
Ŵ (P,r)(b) =
1
2
(
I + (−1)bŴ (P,r)
)
.
Let a =
(
a(D,r)
)
D∈{V,P},r∈[ND] denote an answer vector for all players (where a
(V,r) corre-
sponds to a 6-tuple of bits). Then for every tuple of questions Ŵ , we define
Ŵ (a) =
⊗
D∈{V,P},r∈[ND]
Ŵ (D,r)(a(D,r)).
We define the projectors W˜ (D,r)(b) and W˜ (D,r) analogously.
For convenience we also provide a notation reference table in Figure 2.
4.1 Non-adaptive cheating referees
In this section, we show that for every possible combination of (correctly formatted) questions to
the players, the joint distribution of answers of players using the honest strategy SZK is efficiently
simulable.
The reason for defining the observables W˜ (D,r) is as follows. Ultimately, the goal of the simula-
tor is, for every question tuple Ŵ , to sample answer vectors a that is distributed according to the
probability density
Tr
(
Encouter(Φ) Ŵ (a)
)
where Φ = |Φ〉〈Φ| is the shared entangled state and Ŵ (a) also denotes the projectors corresponding
to outcome a in the honest strategy SZK(x) (see Section 3.2.1). The main difficulty is that the
simulator does not have any control over the prover reflections, nor the parts of Φ that correspond
to the provers’ private registers (which may be unbounded in size).
To get around this issue, the key observation we use is the following: the measurements of the
verifier players are Pauli observables that act on at most a constant number of qubits. Furthermore,
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the measurements of the prover players when they get a question other than the special prover
reflection ⋆ are also just Pauli observables on a constant number of qubits.
We define two notions of support of a question tuple Ŵ . Then, define the physical support of
Ŵ to be the set S′
Ŵ
of qubit registers that are acted upon nontrivially by Ŵ , omitting the prover
players’ private Pr registers. The set S
′
Ŵ
contains subregisters of C′,V′,M,F.
We can also define the logical support of Ŵ , denoted by the set S
Ŵ
, which contains subregisters
of C,V,M,F that correspond to the registers in S′
Ŵ
. The logical support set S
Ŵ
contains all the Mij
and Fi registers that are in S
′
Ŵ
. The set S
Ŵ
contains Ct if and only if S
′
Ŵ
contains Ctj for some
j, and similarly contains Vi if and only if S
′
Ŵ
contains Vij for some j. The difference between the
physical and logical support of Ŵ comes from the fact that the history state |Φ〉 was encoded using
Couter and split between multiple provers.
Note that the number of qubit registers in S
Ŵ
is at most 12NV +k. This is because the questions
to each verifier player is a 6-tuple of Pauli observables that act on up to 2 qubits, and each prover
player measures at most a single qubit flag register at a time. Define L = 12NV = 48, which is the
maximum number of verifier player qubits that can be addressed by Ŵ .
For all Ŵ , the simulator computes a succinct description of density matrix ρ defined only on
the logical registers in S
Ŵ
that mimics Φ in a certain sense that is captured by the following
Lemma 15. Before stating the Lemma, however, we specify what we mean by succinct description
of ρ. In general, ρ will be a density matrix with dimension at least 212NV +k, so the na¨ıve strategy of
explicitly storing all the matrix entires of ρ is not an efficient representation if the number of prover
players k is a growing function. Instead, we will specify our density matrices ρ and measurement
operators using the following type of efficient representation:
Definition 13 (Efficient representations of operators). Let A denote a linear operator defined on m
qubits. The operator A has an (w, ℓ)-efficient representation if there exist, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , w},
a collection of operators {Aij} where each Aij is defined on some subset Sij ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m} of qubit
registers, and
1. For all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , w}, {Sij}j is a partition of {1, 2, . . . ,m}.
2. |Sij | ≤ ℓ for all i, j.
3. The explicit matrix representation of Aij can be described using 2
O(ℓ) bits.
4. A =
∑w
t=1
⊗
j Aij .
The following Claim justifies our definition of “efficient representation”:
Claim 14. Let A,B be m-qubit operators with (w, ℓ)-efficient representations {Aij} and {Bij}, re-
spectively. First, the efficient representations of both operators have bit complexity w · 2O(ℓ) · poly(m).
Second, the trace Tr(AB) can be computed in time w · 2O(ℓ) · poly(m).
We can now state our main simulation Lemma:
Lemma 15. There is a PPT algorithm SimDensity that when given a tuple Ŵ of questions, outputs
a (3(T + 1)L2, 4L)-efficient representation of a density matrix ρ such that for all answer vectors a =(
a(D,r)
)
D∈{V,P},r∈[ND], we have that
Tr
(
Encouter(Φ) Ŵ (a)
)
= Tr
(
Encouter(ρ) W˜ (a)
)
. (3)
Furthermore, the density matrix ρ is defined on the logical support S
Ŵ
of Ŵ .
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Before proving Lemma 15, we first prove a specialized version. Let 1 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T be such
that t2− t1 ≤ L and let I(t1, t2) = {t : t1 ≤ t ≤ t2} denote the interval of time steps between t1 and
t2. We show that we can simulate measurements on the state Encouter(ΦI) where |ΦI(t1,t2)〉 is the
post-measurement state
|ΦI(t1,t2)〉 =
1√
t2 − t1 + 1
∑
t∈I(t1,t2)
|unary(t)〉C ⊗ |Φt〉VMPF
In other words, |ΦI(t1,t2)〉 denotes the part of the history state between times t1 and t2. Furthermore,
when convenient we will omit mention of the unary encoding of the clock, and simply refer to the
state of the clock register as |t〉.
Lemma 16. There is a PPT algorithm SimInterval that when given a tuple Ŵ of questions and a pair
of times 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T such that t2− t1 ≤ L, outputs a (3L2, 4L)-efficient representation of a density
matrix ρ such that for all answer vectors a =
(
a(D,r)
)
D∈{V,P},r∈[ND], we have that
Tr
(
Encouter(ΦI(t1,t2)) Ŵ (a)
)
= Tr
(
Encouter(ρ) W˜ (a)
)
. (4)
Furthermore, the density matrix ρ is defined on the logical support S
Ŵ
of Ŵ .
Proof. Let I = I(t1, t2) and S = SŴ . Because of padding, we can assume without loss of generality
that the time interval I belongs entirely to one of the six phases of the protocol circuit Venc defined
in Section 3.1.
We can write for all t ∈ I,
|Φt〉 = |∆t〉VMP ⊗ |f(t)〉F. (5)
Thus, we have
|ΦI〉〈ΦI | = 1|I|
∑
t,t′∈I
|t〉〈t′|C ⊗ |∆t〉〈∆t′ |VMP ⊗ |f(t)〉〈f(t′)|F.
The left hand side of (4) can be written as
Tr
(
Encouter(ΦI) Ŵ (a)
)
=
1
|I|
∑
t,t′∈I
Tr
(
Encouter
(|t〉〈t′| ⊗ |∆t〉〈∆t′ |)⊗ |f(t)〉〈f(t′)| Ŵ (a)) (6)
We consider two cases.
Case 1. First, suppose that the following holds for all r ∈ [NP ]: either the r’th prover flag pr(t)
stays constant throughout the interval I, or if it changes, then Ŵ (P,r) 6= ⋆ (that is, prover player
PPr was not asked a ⋆ question).
Fix a t, t′ ∈ I. Let Ŵ ⋆(a) denote the tensor factors of Ŵ (a) corresponding to the prover play-
ers who received a ⋆ question (if none received a ⋆ question, then this operator is the identity).
Similarly, let W˜ ⋆(a) denote the tensor factors of W˜ (a) corresponding to the prover players who
received a ⋆ question. Thus, W˜ ⋆(a) is tensor product of σX operators and identity operators. Under
our assumption, any operator A defined on registers CVMP, we have that
Tr
((
A⊗ |f(t)〉〈f(t′)|F
)
Ŵ ⋆(a)
)
= Tr
((
A⊗ |f(t)〉〈f(t′)|F
)
W˜ ⋆(a)
)
.
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This is because of the following: consider the set J ⊆ [NP ] who received a ⋆ question. If J is empty,
then Ŵ ⋆ = W˜ ⋆ = I,9 so the equation trivially holds. If J is non-empty, then by assumption for any
r ∈ J , the prover flags for r stay constant on the interval I, so the traces are 0. This implies that (6)
is equal to
1
|I|
∑
t,t′∈I
Tr
(
Encouter
(|t〉〈t′| ⊗ |∆t〉〈∆t′ |)⊗ |f(t)〉〈f(t′)| W˜ (a))
We now argue that a (1, 4L)-efficient representation of the following operator
ρS(t, t
′) = TrS
(|t〉〈t′| ⊗ |∆t〉〈∆t′ | ⊗ |f(t)〉〈f(t′)|)
can be efficiently computed in polynomial time, whereTrS(·) denotes tracing out all registers except
those in S. Notice that S does not include the register P, and has at most O(NV +k) qubit registers.
Given this is true, and using the fact that |I| ≤ L, then a (L2, 4L)-efficient representation of
ρS =
1
|I|
∑
t,t′∈I
ρS(t, t
′)
can be computed in polynomial time, and satisfies (4).
SinceTrS (|t〉〈t′|) andTrS (|f(t)〉〈f(t′)|) have (1, 1)-efficient representations (i.e. these are tensor
products of single qubit operators), it suffices to show that we can efficiently computeTrS(|∆t〉〈∆t′ |).
Assume without loss of generality that t ≤ t′.
First, we consider the sub-case that all prover flags {pr(t)} stay constant throughout the interval
I. This means that there exists a sequence of elementary gates gt, gt+1, . . . , gt′ (i.e., no prover gates)
such that
|∆t′ 〉 = gt′gt′−1 · · · gt+1gt|∆t〉.
Let G denote the union of the registers that are acted upon by the gates gt, . . . , gt′ . Since t
′ − t ≤
|I| ≤ L, and each gate acts on at most 3 qubits, we get that |G| ≤ 3L. Now, we can write
TrS(|∆t〉〈∆t′ |) = TrS(|∆t〉〈∆t|g†t′ · · · g†t )
= TrG∩S
(
TrS∪G(|∆t〉〈∆t|)g†t′ · · · g†t
)
The density matrix TrS∪G(|∆t〉〈∆t|) is where all registers except for S and G are traced out. We
notice that the number of qubits of this density matrix, |S ∪G|, is at most 4L. We can appeal to the
following Lemma to get that the explicit matrix description of TrS∪G(|∆t〉〈∆t|) can be computed in
polynomial time.
Lemma 17. There exists a PPT algorithm SimSnapshot that on input (x, Y, t) such that
1. x is a binary string
2. Y is a subset of registers used in the honest strategy SZK(x) (that does not include the prover
registers P nor the prover flags F) that has size at most 4L, and
3. t is an integer between 0 and the length of the protocol circuit Venc(x)
outputs matrix entries of the density matrix
TrY (|∆t〉〈∆t|)
where |∆t〉 is defined as in (5).
9We denote the identity matrix as I here in order to avoid confusion with the interval I .
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We defer the proof of Lemma 17 to Section 4.3.
The simulator SimInterval can execute SimSnapshot on (x, S ∪ G, t) to obtain the description
of TrS∪G(|∆t〉〈∆t|), and then perform some efficient post-processing to obtain the explicit matrix
description of TrS(|∆t〉〈∆t′ |).
Putting everything together, we get that
ρS(t, t
′) = TrS
(|t〉〈t′|)⊗ TrS (|∆t〉〈∆t′ |)⊗TrS (|f(t)〉〈f(t′)|)
has a (1, 4L)-efficient representation.
Next, we consider the next sub-case, where the prover flags {pr(t)} do not stay constant. The
interval I lies within the Prover Operation phase. Because of padding, the interval I can at most
cover a single prover’s operation, so there exists a unique r∗ ∈ [NP ] such that pr∗(t) changes (all
others stay constant). Thus, the pr∗ flag changes from 0 to 1 at time t⋆(r
∗). Let t⋆ = t⋆(r∗).
By our assumption at the beginning, Ŵ (P,r
∗) 6= ⋆ (the prover player PPr∗ was not asked the ⋆
question). Since S does not include FPr∗ , for t < t⋆ and t
′ ≥ t⋆, we get that
TrS
(|f(t)〉〈f(t′)|) = 0,
Define I− = {t ∈ I : t < t⋆} and I+ = {t ∈ I : t ≥ t⋆}. We then have
ρS =
1
|I|
 ∑
t,t′∈I−
ρS(t, t
′) +
∑
t,t′∈I+
ρS(t, t
′)
 .
Notice that all prover flags pr(t) stay constant on I
− and I+. Therefore we can reduce to the
previous sub-case to argue that ρS(t, t
′) can be computed when both t, t′ either come from I− or
I+.
This completes the proof of Case 1.
Case 2. Next, we consider the case that there is an r∗ for which the prover flag pr∗(t) changes
from 0 to 1 during the interval I, and furthermore Ŵ (P,r
∗) = ⋆ (the prover player PPr∗ was asked
the ⋆ question). Again, this interval I must lie in the Prover Operation phase and by padding all
other prover flags must be constant throughout the interval I. Let t⋆ = t⋆(r
∗).
Since prover player PPr∗ received the ⋆ question, they could not have received questions QFr∗
or AFr∗ , and therefore FQr∗ and FAr∗ are not part of the logical support set S. Thus the reduced
density matrix of ΦI where we trace out all registers except for S and P is a convex combination
TrS∪P(ΦI) = TrS∪P
( |I−|
|I| ΦI− +
|I⋆|
|I| ΦI⋆ +
|I+|
|I| ΦI+
)
where we define the subintervals
• I− = {t ∈ I : t < t⋆ − 1}
• I⋆ = {t ∈ I : t⋆ − 1 ≤ t ≤ t⋆}
• I+ = {t ∈ I : t ≥ t⋆ + 1}
This is because we are tracing out the Question Flip flag register FQr∗ and Answer Flip flag register
FAr∗ ; so cross-terms where t and t
′ belong to different subintervals above would disappear.
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Therefore (6) is equal to
Tr
(
Encouter(ΦI) Ŵ (a)
)
= Tr
(
Encouter
( |I−|
|I| ΦI− +
|I⋆|
|I| ΦI⋆ +
|I+|
|I| ΦI+
)
Ŵ (a)
)
We now show how to compute (L2, 4L)-efficient representations of density matrices ρ−S , ρ
+
S , ρ
⋆
S such
that
Tr(Encouter(ρ
−
S ) W˜ (a)) = Tr(Encouter(ΦI−) Ŵ (a)) (7)
Tr(Encouter(ρ
+
S ) W˜ (a)) = Tr(Encouter(ΦI+) Ŵ (a)) (8)
Tr(Encouter(ρ
⋆
S) W˜ (a)) = Tr(Encouter(ΦI⋆) Ŵ (a)). (9)
Once we have this, then a (3L2, 4L)-efficient representation of density matrix ρS =
|I−|
|I| ρ
−
S +
|I⋆|
|I| ρ
⋆
S+
|I+|
|I| ρ
+
S is efficiently computable and satisfies (4), and this completes the proof of Case 2.
We argue that ρ−S and ρ
+
S have efficient representations. Notice that the prover flags {pr(t)} are
constant on the intervals I− and I+. Thus from the same arguments as in Case 1, SimInterval can,
when given input Ŵ and a pair of times (min(I−),max(I−)), efficiently compute a (L2, 4L)-efficient
representation of the density matrix ρ−S defined on S that satisfies (7). Similarly, SimInterval can
also efficiently compute an efficient representation of ρ+S that satisfies (8).
We now turn to ρ⋆S . Since we are in Case 2, it must be that I
⋆ = {t⋆ − 1, t⋆} (otherwise, the
prover flag for PPr∗ would stay constant on I). Thus, using that |Φt〉 = |∆t〉 ⊗ |f(t)〉,
|ΦI⋆〉 = 1√
2
[
|t⋆ − 1〉|∆t⋆−1〉|f(t⋆ − 1)〉+ |t⋆〉|∆t⋆ 〉|f(t⋆)〉
]
=
1√
2
[
|t⋆ − 1〉 ⊗ |Φt⋆−1〉+ |t⋆〉 ⊗ P ′r∗ |Φt⋆−1〉
]
(10)
Furthermore, since PPr∗ receives the ⋆ question in Ŵ , the measurement operator Ŵ
(P,r∗)(a) is
simply
1
2
(
I+ (−1)a(P,r
∗)
P ′r∗
)
.
Let Ŵ−(P,r∗)(a) be the measurement operator obtained by taking Ŵ (a) and deleting the factor
Ŵ (P,r
∗), i.e., Ŵ−(P,r∗)(a) is the tensor product of questions of all provers except PPr∗ . Therefore
we can write
Tr
(
Encouter(ΦI⋆) Ŵ (a)
)
= Tr
(
Encouter(ΦI⋆) Ŵ
−(P,r∗)(a)⊗ Ŵ (P,r∗)(a)
)
=
1
2
(
Tr
(
Encouter(ΦI⋆) Ŵ
−(P,r∗)(a)
)
+ (−1)a(P,r
∗)
Tr
(
Encouter(ΦI⋆) Ŵ
−(P,r∗)(a)⊗ P ′r∗
))
(11)
We analyze the first term above. By substituting in the expression (10) for ΦI⋆, we get some cross
terms of the form
Tr
(
Encouter(|t⋆ − 1〉〈t⋆| ⊗ |Φt⋆−1〉〈Φt⋆−1|(P ′r∗)†) Ŵ−(P,r
∗)(a)
)
= Tr
([
Encouter(|t⋆ − 1〉〈t⋆| ⊗ |∆t⋆−1〉〈∆t⋆−1|P †r∗)⊗ |f(t⋆ − 1)〉〈f(t⋆)|
]
Ŵ−(P,r
∗)(a)
)
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Notice that the operator Ŵ−(P,r∗)(a) does not act on the prover flag register FPr∗ , and the FPr∗
component of |f(t⋆ − 1)〉〈f(t⋆)| is |0〉〈1|. Thus, the cross-term vanishes. The first term of (11) can
be written as
1
2
Tr
(
Encouter(|t⋆ − 1〉〈t⋆ − 1| ⊗ |Φt⋆−1〉〈Φt⋆−1|+ |t⋆〉〈t⋆| ⊗ |Φt⋆〉〈Φt⋆ |) Ŵ−(P,r
∗)(a)
)
=
1
2
Tr
(
Encouter ((|t⋆ − 1〉〈t⋆ − 1|+ |t⋆〉〈t⋆|)⊗ |Φt⋆−1〉〈Φt⋆−1|) Ŵ−(P,r
∗)(a)
)
where in the equality we used that |Φt⋆ 〉 = P ′r∗ |Φt⋆−1〉 and the operator P ′r∗ commutes with
Ŵ−(P,r∗)(a), and thus vanishes by the cyclity of the trace. Applying similar reasoning to the second
term of (10), we remain only with the cross terms, and we get that it can be written as
1
2
Tr
(
Encouter ((|t⋆ − 1〉〈t⋆|+ |t⋆〉〈t⋆ − 1|)⊗ |Φt⋆−1〉〈Φt⋆−1|) Ŵ−(P,r
∗)(a)
)
Putting everything together, we get that (11) can be written as
1
2
Tr
(
Encouter (τ(a, t⋆)⊗ |∆t⋆−1〉〈∆t⋆−1| ⊗ |f(t⋆ − 1)〉〈f(t⋆ − 1)|) Ŵ−(P,r
∗)(a)
)
(12)
with
τ(a, t⋆) =
1
2
[
|t⋆ − 1〉+ (−1)a(P,r
∗) |t⋆〉
][
〈t⋆ − 1|+ (−1)a(P,r
∗)〈t⋆|
]
.
Define
ρ⋆S = TrS (τ(a, t⋆)⊗ |∆t⋆−1〉〈∆t⋆−1| ⊗ |f(t⋆ − 1)〉〈f(t⋆ − 1)|) .
Just like in Case 1, the density matrices TrS (τ(a, t⋆)) and TrS (|f(t⋆ − 1)〉〈f(t⋆ − 1)|) have (1, 1)-
efficient representations, and by Lemma 17 we have that TrS (|∆t⋆−1〉〈∆t⋆−1|) can be efficiently
computed as well. This shows that ρ⋆S has a (1, 4L)-efficient representation. Finally, we have that
the Ŵ−(P,r
∗)(a) operator in (12) can be replaced with W˜−(P,r
∗)(a). This shows that ρ⋆S satisfies (9),
and this completes the proof of Case 2.
We now prove Lemma 15.
Proof of Lemma 15. Fix a tuple Ŵ of questions. We argue that computing an efficient description
of a density matrix ρ that satisfies (3) can be efficiently reduced to computing efficient descriptions
of density matrices ρI for various intervals I, for which we can use the algorithm SimInterval from
Lemma 16.
Since there are only NV verifier players, and each verifier player receives a 6-tuple of Pauli
observables that have support on at most 12 physical qubits each, the joint measurement of the
verifier players acts on at most 12NV physical qubits, and therefore at most 12NV logical qubits of
the underlying encoded clock register.
Let
Ctr = {i ∈ [T ] : the i’th logical clock qubit Ci is not in SŴ}
denote the set of (logical) clock qubit registers that, after the outer encoding, are not acted upon
by the measurement corresponding to Ŵ . Thus, for all answer vectors a,
Tr
(
Encouter(Φ) Ŵ (a)
)
= Tr
(
Encouter(TrCtr(Φ)) Ŵ (a)
)
. (13)
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We argue that the density matrix TrCtr(Φ) is a convex combination of |ΦI 〉 states for various inter-
vals I:
TrCtr(Φ) =
1
T + 1
∑
t,t′
TrCtr(|unary(t)〉〈unary(t′)|)⊗ |Φt〉〈Φt′ |. (14)
The following Claim easily follows from the structure of unary encodings:
Claim 18. For all 0 ≤ t, t′ ≤ T , the operator TrCtr(|unary(t)〉〈unary(t′)|) is non-zero only when t = t′,
or for all i ∈ Ctr, either both t, t′ > i, or both t, t′ < i.
Given this Claim, we notice that all cross-terms of (14) involving times t, t′ where t 6= t′ and at
least one of t, t′ are in Ctr vanish. Thus the only cross-terms that remain are times t, t′ that come
from an interval I ⊆ {0, 1, 2, . . . , T} of consecutive time-steps where there is no i ∈ Ctr such that
min(I) ≤ i ≤ max(I). Let {0, 1, 2, . . . , T} \ Ctr be the union of maximal intervals I1, I2, . . . , Iℓ of
consecutive time steps. Thus (14) can be written as
∑
t∈Ctr
1
T + 1
TrCtr(|Φ{t}〉〈Φ{t}|) +
ℓ∑
j=1
|Ij|
T + 1
TrCtr(|ΦIj〉〈ΦIj |)
where |Φ{t}〉 = |unary(t)〉⊗ |Φt〉 denotes the history state restricted to the singleton interval {t}. As
desired, (14) is a probabilistic mixture of interval states |ΦI 〉 where each interval has size at most
6NV ≤ L. The intervals Ij occur with probability |Ij|/(T + 1) and the singleton intervals {t} for
t ∈ Ctr occur with probability 1/(T + 1).
The algorithm SimDensity works as follows: given a question tuple Ŵ it can compute the set
Ctr, and then compute the intervals I1, . . . , Ij in polynomial time. For each interval Ij, it invokes the
algorithm SimInterval from Lemma 16 to efficiently compute a (3L2, 4L)-efficient representation of
the density matrix ρIj supported on SŴ that satisfies
Tr
(
Encouter(ΦIj) Ŵ (a)
)
= Tr
(
Encouter(ρIj) W˜ (a)
)
.
Similarly, for every t ∈ Ctr the algorithm SimDensity invokes SimInterval to compute a (3L2, 4L)-
efficient representation of the density matrix ρt that satisfies
Tr
(
Encouter(Φ{t}) Ŵ (a)
)
= Tr
(
Encouter(ρt) W˜ (a)
)
.
There are at most T +1 density matrices to compute. SimDensity then can then efficiently compute
a (3(T + 1)L2, 4L)-efficient representation of the convex combination
ρ =
∑
t∈Ctr
1
T + 1
ρt +
ℓ∑
j=1
|Ij |
T + 1
ρIj ,
which satisfies (3).
With Lemma 15, we prove that VZK has the zero knowledge property against cheating referees
that are non-adaptive, meaning that the referee samples a question tuple Ŵ first, sends them to
the players, and receives their answers a.
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Lemma 19. For every non-adaptive polynomial-time referee R̂na, there is a PPT simulator Sim
R̂na
such that the output distribution of SimR̂na(x) is equal to View(R̂
na(x)↔ SZK(x)).
Proof. SimR̂na starts by sampling the questions to the players Ŵ =
(
Ŵ (D,r)
)
D∈{V,P},r∈[ND]
from
the same joint distribution as R̂na on input x. This can be performed efficiently since R̂na is a
polynomial-time algorithm and the questions are sampled in a non-adaptive way.
Then, the simulator Sim
R̂na
executes the algorithm SimDensity from Lemma 15 on input Ŵ ,
which outputs an efficient representation of a density matrix ρ such that for all answer vectors
a =
(
a(D,r)
)
D∈{V,P},r∈[ND] we have that
α(a) = Tr
(
Encouter(Φ) Ŵ (a)
)
= Tr
(
Encouter(ρ) W˜ (a)
)
.
Note that α(a) is a probability distribution over answer vectors. We need to show that we can
efficiently sample an answer vector a from the probability distribution α(a). We can do that by
sampling each bit of a one at a time, and conditioning the density matrix ρ on the partial outcomes.
Index the players using {1, 2, . . . , NV +k} in some canonical way. Let a = (a1, . . . , aNV +k) where
ai denotes the answer symbol of the i’th player, which might come from the alphabet {0, 1, }6 or
{0, 1}, depending on whether the i’th player is a prover player or a verifier player.
We utilize the following important observation: for every answer vector a, W˜ (a) is equal to
the tensor product of projectors where the projectors corresponding to the prover players are all
single-qubit operators, and the projectors corresponding to the verifier players may act on up to
12NV qubits.
For every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , NV + k}, let W˜ (ai) denote the projector of the i’th player corresponding
to outcome ai, when the players receive the question tuple Ŵ . Note that W˜ (a) = W˜ (a1) ⊗ · · · ⊗
W˜ (aNV +k).
To sample a1, the simulator can explicitly compute the probabilities
α(a1) = Tr
(
Encouter(Φ) Ŵ (a1)
)
= Tr
(
Encouter(ρ) W˜ (a1)
)
.
for all a1, where we use α(a1) to denote the marginal distribution of a1 in α. Since a1 comes from a
constant-sized alphabet, this distribution can be sampled from in polynomial time. Given a sample
a1, we can now sample a2 conditioned on a1, so we can compute the conditional distribution
α(a2|a1) =
Tr
(
Encouter(ρ) W˜ (a1)⊗ W˜ (a2)
)
α(a1)
,
and sample from it as well. We can continue in this manner, until we have sampled a1 · · · aNV +k.
This can be done in polynomial time, because W˜ (a1)⊗ · · · ⊗ W˜ (ai) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , NV + k} has
a (1, 12NV )-efficient representation.
The simulator then outputs (x, r, Ŵ , a) where r is the randomness used by cheating referee R̂na.
By construction, this output is distributed identically to View(R̂na(x)↔ SZK(x)).
4.2 General cheating referees
We now show that if that for an arbitrary cheating referee R̂, there exists simulator whose output
is distributed according to View(R̂(x)↔ SZK(x)).
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As mentioned earlier, the difficulty is that R̂ could send questions to a set of players, and then
depending on their answers, adaptively choose questions for another set of players, and so on.
The arguments from Section 4.1 strongly rely on the fact that the simulator can sample all of the
questions before sampling the answers. In this section, we show how to simulate the interaction
between the referee and the players in the adaptive scenario.
Lemma 20. For every PPT R̂, there exists a PPT simulator SimR̂ such that the output distribution of
SimR̂(x) is equal to V iew(R̂(x)↔ SZK(x)).
Proof. A general cheating referee R̂ behaves as follows: using randomness, it samples a set of
players B1 ⊆ P = {(D, r) : D ∈ {V, P}, r ∈ [ND]}, followed by some questions ŴB1 for those
players. It sends ŴB1 to the B1 players, and receives a partial answer vector a
B1 . Based on its
randomness and the answers received, the referee samples another set of players B2 ⊆ P \B1 and
questions ŴB2 for the B2 players. We assume that B2 is disjoint from B1 because the players would
abort the protocol if they are interacted more than once. The referee continues in this manner until
it halts.
The general simulator Sim runs the referee R̂ on randomness s to obtain the sample (B1, Ŵ
B1).
To simulate the B1 players’ responses to Ŵ
B1, the simulator will arbitrarily complete ŴB1 to a
question tuple Ŵ1 for all players, and then call SimDensity on Ŵ1 to obtain a density matrix ρ1
defined on registers S
Ŵ1
. With this density matrix, the simulator Sim can sample a partial answer
vector aB1 with probability Tr(Encouter(ρ1) Ŵ
B1(aB1)). This partial answer vector can be sampled
in the same way as described in the simulation for the non-adaptive referee in Lemma 19. Note that
this distribution does not depend how the question tuple ŴB1 was completed, since the distribution
is non-signalling.
Based on this sampled answer vector aB1 and the randomness s, the simulator can continue
executing R̂ to obtain a sample (B2, Ŵ
B2). The simulator then constructs a question tuple Ŵ2 that
contains both ŴB1 and ŴB2 (which are question tuples to disjoint sets of players), and invokes
SimDensity to efficiently compute a density matrix ρ2 defined on registers SŴ2. The simulator can
then sample a partial answer vector aB2 with probability
Tr
(
ŴB2(aB2)⊗ ŴB1(aB1)Encouter(ρ2)
)
Tr(Encouter(ρ2) ŴB1(aB1))
.
Once again, this partial answer vector can be sampled in the same way as described in the proof of
Lemma 19. In the end, the simulator can repeat this process and obtain a sequence (x, s, ŴB1 , aB1 , ŴB2 , aB2 , . . .)
that is distributed identically to View(R̂(x)↔ SZK(x)).
The complete simulation algorithm is described in detail in Figure 3. It is easy to see that the
simulator runs in polynomial time.
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Algorithm: SimR̂(x)
1. Set i = 1.
2. Sample randomness s for R̂.
3. Set π = (x, s).
4. While R̂ has not halted:
(a) Continue the execution of the referee R̂ on randomness s, the previous i − 1 samples
(B1, Ŵ
B1 , a(B1)), . . . , (Bi−1, ŴBi−1 , a(Bi−1)), to obtain a new sample (Bi, ŴBi). If Bi has
non-zero intersection with any of the B1, . . . , Bi−1, add abort to the end of π and output
π.
(b) Let Ŵi denote the question tuple that is the concatenation of Ŵ
B1 , ŴB2 , . . . , ŴBi with
arbitrary questions to the players in P \ (B1 ∪ · · · ∪Bi).
(c) Execute SimDensity on input Ŵi to obtain a (O(T ), O(1))-efficient representation of the
density matrix ρi supported on registers SŴi .
(d) Sample aBi with probability
Tr
(
Πi−1 ⊗ ŴBi(aBi)Encouter(ρi)
)
Tr (Πi−1 Encouter(ρi))
where
Πi−1 = ŴB1(aB1)⊗ · · · ⊗ ŴBi−1(aBi−1).
(e) Add (ŴBi , aBi) to the end of π.
(f) Set i = i+ 1.
5. Output π.
Figure 3: The simulator SimR̂
4.3 Simulating snapshots
We now prove Lemma 17. For convenience we recall the Lemma statement.
Lemma 17. There exists a PPT algorithm SimSnapshot that on input (x, Y, t) such that
1. x is a binary string
2. Y is a subset of registers used in the honest strategy SZK(x) (that does not include the prover
registers P nor the prover flags F) that has size at most 4L, and
3. t is an integer between 0 and the length of the protocol circuit Venc(x)
outputs matrix entries of the density matrix
TrY (|∆t〉〈∆t|)
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where |∆t〉 is defined as in (5).
Proof. Fix the protocol circuit Venc = Venc(x). For convenience, we omit mention of the input x
for the remainder of this proof. Let T denote the length of the circuit Venc. We notice that our
parameters imply that 4L = 192, and therefore Cinner is a 4L-simulatable code and we denote m as
the blocklength of this code, as defined in Theorem 6.
The protocol circuit acts on registers A,B,O,N,M,P. Since the set Y does not include any
subregister of the prover register P, we only consider the subregisters of R = ABONM. At each
time t, we say that a group of m qubit registers Ri1 , . . . ,Rim form an encoded block if and only if
Π|∆t〉 = |∆t〉 where Π is the projector onto the codespace for the qubits Ri1 , . . . ,Rim . Since the
protocol circuit Venc(x) can be computed in polynomial time, determining the encoded block of
qubits than a physical qubit belongs to can be efficiently done.
As explained in Section 3.1.1, we split the phases of the circuit into micro-phases. For every
time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , T}, let start(t) ≤ t denote the start of the micro-phase containing time t, and
let end(t) ≥ t denote the end of the micro-phase containing time t. For each time t, we can partition
the qubit subregisters into three categories:
• Active: These are qubits that have been acted upon by a gate gt′ for some time t′ ∈ {start(t), . . . , t}.
Let A(t) denote the set of active qubit registers at time t.
• Encoded qubits: These are qubits that belong to an encoded block, and are not active. Let
E(t) denote the set of encoded qubit registers at time t.
• Unencoded qubits: These are unencoded ancilla qubits in the state |0〉 or in the state |1〉,
and are not active. Let U0(t) and U1(t) denote the sets of unencoded qubit registers in the
state |0〉 an |1〉, respectively, at time t.
Unencoded qubits are in a “known” state throughout the entire circuit Venc in the sense that their
state is independent of the input x. In fact, for all t the state |∆t〉 can be written as
|∆t〉 = |Σt〉A(t)E(t) ⊗ |0 · · · 0〉U0(t) ⊗ |1 · · · 1〉U1(t)
where |Σt〉 corresponds to the registers that are either active or encoded, and the remaining qubits
are unencoded ancillas.
By construction, the protocol circuit Venc satisfies the following invariant: at the beginning and
end of every micro-phase of the circuit, all qubit subregisters are either encoded, or unencoded.
Qubits can only be active within a micro-phase.
We now argue that the description of TrY (|∆t〉〈∆t|) can be efficiently computed for all t. We
argue this for each micro-phase separately. Let t0 = start(t).
Idling phase During an idling phase, all qubits are either encoded or unencoded, and none are
active. The reduced density matrix TrY (|∆t〉〈∆t|) thus consists of either at most |Y | unencoded |0〉
and |1〉 ancilla qubits, and the reduced density matrix of some encoded blocks on at most |Y | ≤ 4L
qubits. By Theorem 6, the reduced density matrix of the encoded blocks is efficiently computable,
and thus TrY (|∆t〉〈∆t|) is efficiently computable.
Resource encoding In a resource encoding phase, a constant number of unencoded ancilla bits
in |∆t0〉 will be transformed into an encoded resource state in |∆end(t)〉, and the rest of the qubits
are either in an encoded block or unencoded ancilla qubits. Thus the reduced density matrix
TrY (|∆t〉〈∆t|) is a tensor product of the reduced density matrix of some encoded blocks (which is
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efficiently computable by Theorem 6), unencoded ancilla qubits, and the reduced density matrix of
the intermediate state of a resource encoding circuit acting on a constant number of ancillas (which
is efficiently computable). Thus TrY (|∆t〉〈∆t|) is efficiently computable.
Logical operation In a logical operation micro-phase, either a logical Hadamard, logical CNOT,
or logical Toffoli are being implemented on some encoded code blocks as well as some unencoded
ancilla qubits. Let U ∈ {H,Λ(X),Λ2(X)} be the logical gate, and O1, O2, . . . , Ot−t0 denote the first
t− t0 gates of the encoding of U . We have that
|∆t〉 = Ot−t0 · · ·O1|∆t0 〉.
Since all qubits of |∆t0 〉 are correctly encoded, this corresponds to the simulation in the middle
of the application of a logical gate, and again by Theorem 6, TrY (|∆t〉〈∆t|) can also be efficiently
computable.
Output decoding In the honest strategy SZK(x), the state |∆t0 〉 can be written as a tensor product
|∆t0〉 = Encinner(|1〉)O ⊗ |Σt0〉E(t0) ⊗ |0 · · · 0, 1 · · · 1〉U(t0).
This is because by assumption the strategy SZK(x) causes the protocol circuit Venc to accept with
probability 1, and therefore the register O at the beginning of the Output Decoding phase will store
an encoding of |1〉.
Therefore, the reduced density matrix TrY (|∆t〉〈∆t|) is a tensor product of the reduced density
matrix of a decoding circuit acting on Encinner(|1〉) (which is efficiently computable), the reduced
density matrix of |Σt0〉 on at most |Y | ≤ 4L qubits (which is efficiently computable by Theorem 6),
and a constant number of unencoded ancilla qubits. Thus TrY (|∆t〉〈∆t|) is efficiently computable.
4.4 Completing the proof of Theorem 1
If the completeness and soundness of the originalMIP∗ protocol for L are 1 and s respectively, then
the soundness of the resulting zero knowledge protocol VZK for L has completeness 1 (i.e. perfect
completeness) and has soundness s′ that is polynomially related to 1− s:
s′ ≤ 1− (1− s)
β
p(n)
for some universal constant β and polynomial p.
Our zero knowledge transformation is not immediately gap preserving, in the sense that if 1−s is
a constant, the new soundness s′ is only separated from 1 by an inverse polynomial. Since the stan-
dard definition of the complexity classes QMIP, MIP∗, and PZK-MIP∗ have constant completeness-
soundness gaps, our result does not immediately show that MIP∗ ⊆ QMIP ⊆ PZK-MIP∗.
To remedy this, we employ the gap amplification techniques described in Section 2.5. Suppose
that the soundness s′ of VZK is at most 1−1/q for some polynomial q. First, we apply the anchoring
transformation to VZK to obtain a new protocol VZK,⊥ such that
ω∗(VZK,⊥) = α+ (1− α)ω∗(VZK)
for some constant α. Then, we use Theorem 11 of Bavarian, Vidick and Yuen [3] to argue that the
parallel repetition of VZK,⊥ has the desired soundness properties. In the case that ω∗(VZK) = 1,
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then ω∗(V mZK,⊥) = 1 for allm. Otherwise, for some polynomialm that depends on q, k, α, and VZK ,
we have that ω∗(V mZK,⊥) ≤ 1− (1−s)γ for some universal constant γ. Thus, the soundness of V mZK,⊥
is polynomially related to the original completeness-soundness gap 1− s, and it also decides L.
It remains to argue that the amplified protocol V mZK,⊥ still has the perfect zero knowledge prop-
erty. In general, this is a delicate issue, since it is known that parallel repetition does not preserve
zero knowledge in a black box manner [20, 5, 33].
In our case, however, since the referee is constrained to interacting with each prover only once,
we can simulate the interaction in the amplified protocol V mZK,⊥ by essentially running many copies
of the simulator SimR̂ described in Figure 3 in parallel. Notice that the honest strategy for V
m
ZK,⊥
consists of sharing m copies of the history state, and performing independent measurements on
each of these copies. It is not hard to see that the interaction in V mZK,⊥ can be simulated efficiently.
The number of provers involved in the protocol executed by V mZK,⊥ is k + 4, and the protocol is
1-round, which implies that
L ∈ PZK-MIP∗1,s′′ [k + 4, 1].
where s′′ ≤ 1− (1− s)γ . This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
5 Simulatable codes
In this section we show the existence of simulatable codes. We start by introducing stabilizer codes
and some notation in Section 5.1. Then, we analyse low-weight measurements on codewords of a
stabilizer QECC in Section 5.2. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4 we show how to simulate low-weight mea-
surements on the encoding of transversal and non-transversal gates, respectively. Finally, in Sec-
tion 5.5 we show that the concatenated Steane code is a simulatable code.
5.1 Stabilizer codes
We present some preliminary background on stabilizer codes, an important class of QECCs. For an
in-depth reference on stabilizer codes, we recommend consulting [22].
Let Pn be the n-qubit Pauli group, so Pn is the set of n-qubit unitaries W1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Wn, where
Wi ∈ {±I,±iI,±X,±iX,±Y,±iY,±Z,±iZ} for all i = 1, . . . , n. The weight of an element W1 ⊗
· · · ⊗Wn ∈ Pn is |{1 ≤ i ≤ n :Wi 6∈ {±I,±iI}|.
An [[n, k]] stabilizer code is specified by an abelian subgroup S ⊆ Pn such that −I 6∈ S, and any
minimal generating set of S has size n− k. Usually we fix a minimal generating set g1, . . . , gn−k of
S, and refer to these elements as the stabilizers of the code. The codespace of an [[n, k]] stabilizer
code S is the subspace of vectors in C2n fixed by S. In other words, |ψ〉 is in the code if and only
if g|ψ〉 = |ψ〉 for all g ∈ S. This space always has dimension 2k, and hence an [[n, k]] stabilizer
code can encodes k-qubit states in n-qubit states. To fix one of all the possible encodings of k-qubit
states, we can find Z1, . . . , Zk ∈ Pn such that S ′ = 〈g1, . . . , gn−k, Z1, . . . , Zk〉 is abelian and is
minimally generated by g1, . . . , gk, Z1, . . . , Zk. The encoding then sends the computational basis
state |x1 · · · xk〉 to the unique state in the codespace fixed by g1, . . . , gk, (−1)x1Z1, . . . , (−1)xkZk.
More generally, an [[n, k]] stabilizer code can be used to encode mk-qubit states in mn-qubit
states. This can be expressed in the stabilizer formalism by taking the product of the stabilizer
code with itself m times. Specifically Let ∆in,mn : Pn → Pmn be the inclusion10 induced by having
Pn act on qubits (i − 1)n + 1, (i − 1)n + 2, . . . , in of an mn-qubit register. For example, we have
10An inclusion map f : A 7→ B consists in treating an element x ∈ A, as an element of B.
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∆22,6(X ⊗ Z) = I ⊗ I ⊗X ⊗ Z ⊗ I ⊗ I. When n and m are clear, we write ∆i for ∆in,mn. Given a
stabilizer code S with stabilizers g1, . . . , gn−k in Pn, let
S⊗m := 〈∆i(gj) where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n− k〉.
This defines an [[mn,mk]] stabilizer code with minimal generating set {∆i(gj)}. To encode mk-
qubit states in this code, we can take elements Z1, . . . , Zk ∈ Pn specifying an encoding of S as
above. Then elements ∆i(Zj), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ k specify an encoding for the code S⊗m.
Every pair of elements g, h ∈ Pn either commute or anticommute. Since stabilizer codes do not
contain −I by definition, the normalizer N(S) of a stabilizer code S in Pn is the set of all elements
of Pn which commute with every element in S. The distance of a stabilizer code is the smallest
integer d such that N(S) \ S contains an element of weight d. An [[n, k, d]] stabilizer code is an
[[n, k]] stabilizer code of distance ≥ d.
5.2 Computing partial trace of codewords
Suppose we want to the compute the partial trace TrQ(ρ) for some n-qubit state ρ and subset
of qubits Q. Because P|Q| contains an orthogonal basis (in the Hilbert-Schmidt inner product)
for 2|Q| × 2|Q| matrices and is closed under the adjoint operation, it is sufficient to compute the
inner products Tr(TrQ(ρ)w) for all elements w ∈ P|Q|. Extending the notation from Section 5.1,
let ∆Qn : P|Q| → Pn be the inclusion induced by having elements of P|Q| act on qubits Q (so for
instance, ∆in,mn = ∆
Q
mn where Q = {(i − 1)n + 1, . . . , in} ⊆ {1, . . . ,mn}). Then
Tr
(
TrQ(ρ)w
)
= Tr(ρ∆Qn (w)),
so to compute TrQ(ρ), it is sufficient to be able to compute Tr(ρ∆
Q
n (w)) for all w ∈ P|Q|. We record
this fact in the following lemma:
Lemma 21. The partial tracesTrQ(ρ) of an n-qubit state ρ can be computed from the tracesTr(ρ∆
Q
n (w)),
w ∈ P|Q|, in time exp(O(|Q|)).
For a stabilizer code S, we can easily compute Tr(Enc(ρ)w), without knowing ρ, as long as w is
not in N(S) \ S.
Lemma 22. Let Enc(ρ) be an encoding of a k-qubit state ρ in an [[n, k]] stabilizer code S, and suppose
w 6∈ N(S) \ S. Then
Tr(Enc(ρ)w) =
{
1 w ∈ S
0 w 6∈ S .
Proof. If w ∈ S, then Enc(ρ)w = Enc(ρ) by definition, since w fixes the codespace of S. So
Tr(Enc(ρ)w) = Tr(Enc(ρ)) = 1.
Suppose w 6∈ N(S). Let g1, . . . , gn−k be a minimal generating set for S. By a standard argument,
we can assume that g2, . . . , gn−k commute with w, and g1 anticommutes. Let
P =
(
I + g1
2
)(
I + g2
2
)
· · ·
(
I + gn−k
2
)
,
the projection onto the codespace of Enc(ρ). Then Pw = wP ′, where
P ′ =
(
I − g1
2
)(
I + g2
2
)
· · ·
(
I + gn−k
2
)
,
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an orthogonal projection to P . So
Tr(Enc(ρ)w) = Tr(PEnc(ρ)Pw) = Tr(PEnc(ρ)wP ′) = Tr(P ′PEnc(ρ)w) = 0.
In particular, if S is an [[n, k, d]] stabilizer code, and |Q| < d, then ∆Qn (w) will have weight < d
for all w ∈ P|Q|, and hence Tr(Enc(ρ)∆Qn (w)) will be equal to 1 or 0 for all w ∈ PQ, depending
on whether ∆Qn (w) ∈ S. If S is non-degenerate, meaning that every element of S has weight ≥ d,
then Tr(Enc(ρ)∆Qn (w)) = 0 unless ∆
Q
n (w) is the identity matrix, so TrQ(Enc(ρ)) will be maximally
mixed. If the code is degenerate, TrQ(Enc(ρ)) will not always be maximally mixed; instead, it is
maximally mixed over the invariant subspace of the degenerate stabilizers.
If S is an [[n, k, d]] stabilizer code, then the product code S⊗m only has distance d (and hence is
an [[mn,mk, d]] code). However, we can say more about when an element of Pmn is in N(S⊗m).
Lemma 23. Let S be an [[n, k, d]] code, and suppose w1, . . . , wm are elements of Pn. Then w =
w1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ wm ∈ Pmn belongs to N(S⊗m) if and only if wi ∈ N(S) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. In particular, if
wi has weight < d for every 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then w ∈ N(S⊗m) if and only if w ∈ S⊗m.
Proof. Suppose w ∈ N(S⊗m). Then w∆i(g)w−1 = ∆i(g) for all g ∈ S. But w = ∆1(w1) · · ·∆m(wm),
so w∆i(g)w−1 = ∆i(wigw−1i ). Since ∆
i is an inclusion, wi ∈ N(S).
If wi has weight < d for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and w ∈ N(S⊗m), then we must have wi ∈ S for all
1 ≤ i ≤ m, and hence w ∈ S⊗m.
5.3 Simulatable encoding of transversal Clifford gates
We now consider what happens if we add operations on encoded states into the picture. For sim-
plicity of description, we restrict to [[n, 1, d]] stabilizer codes. Recall that the n-qubit Clifford group
Cn is the normalizer of Pn in the group of unitaries.
Lemma 24. Let S be an [[n, 1, d]] stabilizer code, let ρ be a k-qubit state, and let O1, . . . , Oℓ ∈ Cnk
such that Oi acts on a subset Qi of the physical qubits of S⊗k, where Qi ∩Qj = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ ℓ,
and Qi contains at most one physical qubit from each logical qubit of S⊗k for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
If Q is a subset of the physical qubits of S⊗k with |Q| < d, then we can compute
Tr
(
Oℓ · · ·O1Enc(ρ)(Oℓ · · ·O1)†∆Qnk(w)
)
for all w ∈ P|Q| without knowledge of ρ. Furthermore, if n and d are constant, then this computation
can be done in polynomial time in k, ℓ, and the maximum amount of time needed to compute O†i gOi ∈
Pnk for any 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ and g ∈ Pnk.
Proof. Since Oℓ · · ·O1 ∈ Cnk,
(Oℓ · · ·O1)†∆Qnk(w) = w′(Oℓ · · ·O1)†,
where w′ ∈ Pnk can be computed in time polynomial in ℓ and the time needed to compute O†i gOi
for any g ∈ Pnk and 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
Let R = Q \ ⋃ℓi=1Qi. Write w′ = W1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Wnk where Wj ∈ P1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ nk, and let
wa = W(a−1)n+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Wan, so wa contains the operators corresponding to the ath logical qubit,
1 ≤ a ≤ k. Since the operators Oi act on disjoint sets of physical qubits, if Wj 6∈ {±I,±iI}, then
either j ∈ R, or j ∈ Qi for some i with Qi ∩Q 6= ∅. Because
|{(a− 1)n+ 1, . . . , an} ∩Qi| ≤ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ,
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we see that the weight of wa is at most
|{1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ : Qi ∩Q 6= ∅}| + |R| ≤ |Q| < d.
By Lemma 23, w′ ∈ S⊗k if and only if w′ ∈ N(S⊗k). Also, w′ ∈ N(S⊗k) if and only if wa ∈ N(S)
for all 1 ≤ a ≤ ℓ. Since S is fixed, we can check whether wa ∈ N(S) in constant time, and hence
we can determine whether w′ ∈ S⊗k.
Finally, we have
Tr
(
Oℓ · · ·O1Enc(ρ)(Oℓ · · ·O1)†∆Qnk(w)
)
= Tr
(
Oℓ · · ·O1Enc(ρ)w′(Oℓ · · ·O1)†
)
= Tr(Enc(ρ)w′).
Since w′ 6∈ N(S⊗k) \ S⊗k,
Tr(Enc(ρ)w′) =
{
1 w′ ∈ S⊗m
0 w′ 6∈ S⊗m.
by Lemma 22.
With the previous lemma, we can show how to simulate the transversal encoding of Clifford
gates.
Proposition 25. If the [[n, 1, d]] stabilizer code accepts a transversal encoding of a k-qubit Clifford gate
G, then such encoding is s simulatable for all s < d.
Proof. Let ρ be an n-qubit state, a = (a1, ..., ak) be a k-tuple of disjoint integers between 1 and n
and O1(a, . . . , Oℓ(a) be the encoding of G(a) for ℓ = n, and let S be a subset of {1, . . . , ℓn} with
|S| ≤ s.
If 1 ≤ t ≤ ℓ, then the set of gates O1(a), . . . , Ot(a) satisfy the conditions of Lemma 24, and
furthermore, since Oi(a) acts on at most k physical qubits, Oi(a)
†wOi(a) can be computed in poly-
nomial time in n for all w ∈ Pℓn.
The proposition follows from Lemmas 21 and 24.
5.4 Simulatable encoding of non-transversal gates
It is well known that there is no QECC where all logical operations from a universal set of gates
can be performed transversally. In order to circumvent this barrier, we can use other tools from
fault-tolerant quantum computation, namely magic states.
The general procedure for applying a k-qubit gate G using a magic state for it is depicted in
Figure 4. The input to this procedure is some k-qubit state ρ, on which we want to apply G, and
the magic state |MagicG〉. In the first phase, a unitary V0 is applied to both registers. In the second
phase, some of the qubits are measured. Finally, classical controled unitaries Vi are applied. We
assume for simplicity that each Vi can be applied transversally
11. The output of this procedure is
then GρG†.
11More generally, we could assume that Vi can be decomposed on gates that can be applied transversally and then the
encoding of Vi consists of the sequence of encoding for each of these gates.
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V0
• •
• •
• ... •
ρ
V1 V2 V3 Vm−2 Vm−1 Vm
|MagicG〉
Figure 4: Teleportation gadget
There are two issues when one try to prove that the encoding of such gadget is simulatable. First,
it would be necessary to decode the measured qubit to perform the controlled unitary, and this could
make the encoding non-simulatable. In order to solve this problem, we present in Section 5.4.1 an
extra property that we require from our QECC and how it allows us to define the non-transversal
encoding of G. Secondly, measurements are not allowed in Definition 5. In this case, we show how
to perform a coherent encoding of gate G in Section 5.4.2.
With these two pieces in hand, we are able to show the simulation of the coherent non-
transversal encoding of G in Section 5.4.3.
5.4.1 Simulatable encoding of classically-controlled transversal gates
As mentioned before, one of the possible issues when simulating the encoding of Figure 4 is that
the control qubit must be decoded during the gadget. Here, we show how to workaround this issue
by assuming that the QECC has the following property.
Definition 26. For b ∈ {0, 1}, let Eb be the set of strings in Enc(|b〉). A QECC S is order-consistent
with a set of unitaries V if for every V ∈ V and every x ∈ Eb, it follows that V |x| = V b.
We require then our QECC to be order-consistent with the set of unitaries V = {V0, ..., Vm}
in Figure 4. In order to explain how the non-transversal encoding works, let us first assume that
starting from Enc(|b〉)⊗ |ψ〉, we want to apply V b on |ψ〉 without decoding |b〉. This operation can
be implemented by applying the gates
O1, O2, . . . , On
where Oi is a Λ(V )-gate with the ith qubit of Enc(|b〉) as the control qubit and |ψ〉 as target. We
depict such encoding in Figure 5.
Notice that this sequence of gates performs the correct logical operation, since after applying
O1, O2, . . . , On, the resulting state is ∑
x∈Eb
αx|x〉V |x||ψ〉, (15)
where Eb is the set of string in the support of Enc(|b〉). Since we assume that the QECC is order-
consistent with V, we have that Equation (15) is equal to
Enc(|b〉)V b|ψ〉.
We can extend this idea and have an encoding of |ψ〉, and then we can just decompose Oi
Oi = Oi,1, Oi,2, . . . , Oi,n
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... •
Enc(ρ) V V V Enc(V bρ(V b)†)
Enc(|b〉)
Figure 5: Non-transversal encoding the controlled gates
where Oi,j is a Λ(V ) gate with the ith physical qubit of the encoding of the logical control bit, and
the target are the jth physical qubits of the encoding of the logical target state.
With this tool, we are able to prove the encoding of Λ(V ) is simulatable if the control is a
classical known bit.
Lemma 27. Let S be a [[n, 1, d]] stabilizer code that is order-consistent with some k-qubit unitary V
which has a transversal encoding in S. Then the non-transversal encoding of
Λ(V ) (|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ) Λ(V )†
for some fixed x ∈ {0, 1} is s-simulatable for any s < d− k.
Proof. The non-transversal encoding of Λ(V ) consists of O1,1, O2,1, . . . , On,1, O1,2, . . . , On,n, where
Oi,j is the Λ(V ) gate with control on the ith physical qubit of the encoding of the first qubit and jth
physical qubits of the logical target qubits.
Let S be the subset of qubits for which we want to compute
TrS(O(t1,t2)O(t1−1,t2) · · ·O2,1O1,1Enc(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ)(O(t1 ,t2)O(t1−1,t2) · · ·O2,1O1,1)†),
with |S| ≤ s,
Enc(|x〉) =
∑
y∈{0,1}(k+1)n
αy|y〉,
and
Enc(|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ) =
∑
y,z∈{0,1}n
αyα
∗
z|y〉〈z| ⊗ Enc(ρ).
We can fix the computational basis states |y〉 and |z〉 in the support of Enc(|x〉) and the result will
follow by linearity. Let V (j) denote the gate V applied to the jth physical qubits of the encodings
of each qubit of ρ. We have that
O(t1,t2)O(t1−1,t2) · · ·O2,1O1,1|y〉〈z| ⊗ Enc(ρ)(O(t1 ,t2)O(t1−1,t2) · · ·O2,1O1,1)†
= |y〉〈z| ⊗ V (t2)bV (t2 − 1)xV (t2 − 2)x · · ·V (1)xEnc(ρ) (V (t2)cV (t2 − 1)xV (t2 − 2)x · · · V (1)x)† ,
where we use the fact that V (j)|y| = V (j)x for every y in Enc(|x〉) and we define b = y1 + . . . + yt1
and c = z1 + . . . + zt1 . Let S1 = S ∩ {1, . . . , n}, and let S2 = S \ S1 (relabelled to be a subset of
{1, . . . , kn}). Then
TrS(O(t1,t2)O(t1−1,t2) · · ·O2,1O1,1|y〉〈z| ⊗ Enc(ρ)(O(t1 ,t2)O(t1−1,t2) · · ·O2,1O1,1)†)
= TrS1(|y〉〈z|)⊗ TrS2
(
V (t2)
bV (t2 − 1)x · · ·V (1)xEnc(ρ) (V (t2)cV (t2 − 1)xV (t2 − 2)x · · ·V (1)x)†
)
.
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Because x, y, z and the code are fixed, we can computeTrS1(|y〉〈z|) explicitly, so the only remaining
step is to compute
TrS2
(
V (t2)
bV (t2 − 1)x · · ·V (1)xEnc(ρ) (V (t2)cV (t2 − 1)xV (t2 − 2)x · · · V (1)x)†
)
.
By Lemma 21, it suffices to compute
TrS2
(
V (t2)
bV (t2 − 1)x · · ·V (1)xEnc(ρ) (V (t2)cV (t2 − 1)xV (t2 − 2)x · · ·V (1)x)†∆S2kn(w)
)
. (16)
for all w ∈ P|S2|. Since x is fixed, and can compute b and c from y and z. Hence if b = c, we can
compute (16) by Lemma 24, without knowledge of ρ, since |S2| ≤ |S| ≤ d. If b 6= c, then we can
rewrite V (t2)
b(V (t2)
c)† as a linear combination of weight k elements of Pkn, meaning that we can
compute (16) as long as we can compute
Tr
(
V (t2 − 1)x · · ·V (1)xEnc(ρ)V (1)x · · ·V (t2 − 1)xw′
)
where w′ has weight at most |S2|+ k ≤ s+ k < d. So once again, we can compute this trace using
Lemma 24.
5.4.2 Coherent encoding
We now present how to remove the measurements from Figure 4. First, we notice that measuring
one qubit is equivalent of copying (Λ(X)) it into a fresh |0〉 ancilla, and then tracing out this ancilla.
ρ
(a) Measurement
/
•
(b) Coherent measurement
Figure 6: Replacing measurement by coherent measurement
Even though this is sufficient to remove the measurements of Figure 4, this will not be sufficient
for the simulation, since we cannot guarantee that the ancilla will be traced out, and it could be
hard to keep track of the entangled values. However, if we are just interested in a subset S of qubits
with |S| ≤ s for a fixed s, we can repeat the previous procedure with s ancillas, and in this case,
one of such s+ 1 register must be traced out when simulating on S. We depict this in Figure 7.
...
• • •
|0〉s
Figure 7: Coherent measurement with more ancilla
5.4.3 Simulation of coherent non-transversal encoding
Starting with Figure 4 and making it non-transversal, as defined in Section 5.4.1, and coherent, as
defined in Section 5.4.2, we get the circuit defined in Figure 8.
44
...
...
V0
• • •
• • •
• • • •
V1 V2 V3 Vm
|MagicG〉

|0〉⊗ks
Figure 8: The coherent non-transversal encoding of G
For simplicity, we denote U0, . . . , Um+ks the gates of Figure 8 such that U0 = V0, Ui denotes the
Λ(X) where the control is the (i (mod k))th input qubit and the target is the ith ancilla qubit for
1 ≤ i ≤ ks; and Ui denotes the controlled-Vi−ks for i > ks.
By the correctness of the G-gadget of Figure 4, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 28. Let U0, . . . , Um+ks be the quantum gates of the coherent non-transversal encoding of a
k-qubit gate G. Let us also assume that for any k-qubit state |ψ〉, there are states |ψx〉, x ∈ {0, 1}k ,
such that
U0|ψ〉|MagicG〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}k
1√
2k
|x〉|ψx〉.
It follows that
Uks · · ·U0|φ〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}k
1√
2k
|x〉⊗s+1|ψx〉 and U |φ〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}k
1√
2k
|x〉⊗s+1G|ψ〉.
We are now ready to prove that the encoding of the gadget depicted in Figure 8 is simulatable.
Proposition 29. Let U0, . . . , Um+ks be the quantum gates of the coherent non-transversal encoding of a
k-qubit gate G. Let also S be a [[n, k, d]] stabilizer code that is order-consistent with Ui, 0 ≤ i ≤ m+ks.
If for any k-qubit state |ψ〉, there are states |ψx〉, x ∈ {0, 1}k , such that
U0|ψ〉|MagicG〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}k
1√
2k
|x〉|ψx〉, (17)
then the coherent non-transversal encoding of G is s-simulatable for any s < d− k.
Proof. Let ρ be a the logical k-qubit state on whose encoding we want to apply the logical gateG and
let σ = |0〉〈0|)⊗ks ⊗ ρ ⊗ |MagicG〉〈MagicG| Suppose that each Ui above is encoded by operations
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Ori , . . . , Ori+1−1, where 1 = r0 < r1 < . . . < rks+m = ℓ + 1. In order to show that the code is
simulatable, we need to show how to compute
TrS(Ot · · ·O1Enc (σ) (Ot · · ·O1)†)
= TrS((Ot · · ·Ori+1)Enc
(
Ui−1 · · ·U0σ(Ui−1 · · ·U0)†
)
(Ot · · ·Ori+1)†), (18)
for ri ≤ t ≤ ri+1 and 0 ≤ i ≤ ks+m.
By Proposition 25, if 0 ≤ i ≤ ks, we can compute the partial trace in Equation (18) for any
|S| < d without knowledge of ρ in polynomial time in |S| and (a1, ..., ak), since Ui can be applied
transversally .
It remains to compute the partial trace in Equation (18) when ks < i ≤ ks +m. From Equa-
tion (17) and Lemma 28, we have
TrS
(
Ot · · ·O1Enc(σ)(Ot · · ·O1)†
)
=
∑
x∈{0,1}k
1
2k
TrS
(
Ot · · ·OrksEnc
(
(|x〉〈x|)⊗s+1 ⊗ ρx
)
(Ot · · ·Orks)†
)
.
for some collection of states ρx and we implicitly used the fact that since |S| ≤ s and there are s+1
registers containing the encoding of x, then there must be a register with an encoding of x that
does not overlap with S.
For a fixed x, we can continue to simplify, writing
TrS
(
Ot · · ·OrksEnc
(
(|x〉〈x|)⊗s+1 ⊗ ρx
)
(Ot · · ·Orks)†
)
= TrS
(
Ot · · ·OriEnc
(
Uri−1 · · ·Urks(|x〉〈x|)⊗s+1 ⊗ ρx(Uri−1 · · ·Urks)†
)
(Ot · · ·Ori)†
)
= TrS
(
Ot · · ·OriEnc((|x〉〈x|)⊗s+1 ⊗ ρ′x)(Ot · · ·Ori)†
)
for some state ρ′x, where the equalities follow because S is order-consistent with all Vi and Urks , . . . , Uri−1
are only control gates on the first k(s+ 1) logical qubits.
Thus we only need to compute
TrS
(
Ot · · ·Ori)Enc((|x〉〈x|)⊗s+1 ⊗ ρ′x)(Ot · · ·Ori)†
)
for every (known) x ∈ {0, 1}k and (unknown) states ρ′x, and this can be done efficiently from
Lemma 27 if |S| ≤ s < d− k. In this case,
TrS
(
Ot · · ·O1Enc((|0〉〈0|)⊗ks ⊗ ρ⊗ |MagicG〉〈MagicG|)(Ot · · ·O1)†
)
is a linear combination of a constant number of matrices which can be computed without knowl-
edge of ρ, in time polynomial in S and 2k. Hence the encoding is s-simulatable.
5.5 Explicit construction
In this section, we show that the family of concatenated Steane codes is simulatable. We start by
defining the (concatenated) Steane code in Section 5.5.1 and then in Section 5.5.2 we argue that
it is simulatable, proving Theorem 6.
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5.5.1 Steane code
The Steane code is the [[7, 1, 3]] code stabilized by the following generators:
I I I X X X X
I X X I I X X
X I X I X I X
I I I Z Z Z Z
I Z Z I I Z Z
Z I Z I Z I Z
Table 1: Generators of the Steane code
In particular, the encoding of the basis states are then
Enc(|0〉) = 1
2
√
2
(|0000000〉 + |1010101〉 + |0110011〉 + |1100110〉
+ |0001111〉 + |1011010〉 + |0111100〉 + |1101001〉), (19)
and
Enc(|1〉) = 1
2
√
2
(|1111111〉 + |0101010〉 + |1001100〉 + |0011001〉
+ |1110000〉 + |0100101〉 + |1000011〉 + |0010110〉), (20)
and the encoding of an arbitrary one-qubit pure state |ψ〉 and one-qubit mixed state ρ are defined
by linearity.
We define the concatenated Steane codes by letting Steane1 = Steane denote the [[7, 1, 3]] Steane
code, and setting SteaneK = SteaneK−1 ◦Steane, a [[7K , 1, 3K ]] code. We notice that the concate-
nated Steane code can also be expressed in the stabilizer formalism. Suppose we have constructed
a stabilizer code Sj for Steanej for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K − 1. Let g1, . . . , g6 ∈ S1 be the stabilizers for
Steane, and let h1, . . . , hm−1 be a minimal generating set for SK−1, where m = 7K−1. To encode
the m physical qubits of SteaneK−1 using Steane, we form the stabilizer S⊗m1 . Define a homomor-
phism ∆ : Pm → P7m by sending ∆i1,m(W ) 7→ ∆i7,7m(WWWWWWW ) for eachW ∈ P1 (in other
words, we replace W in the ith position with WWWWWWW , so Z gets replaced with Z, etc.).
The operator ∆(w) gives an encoding of w in Steane, so we can express SteaneK in the stabilizer
formalism by taking the stabilizer code SK with minimal generating set
{∆i7,7m(gj), 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ i ≤ 6} ∪ {∆(hj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1}.
SteaneK contains stabilizers of weight 4 for all K ≥ 1, so while Steane is nondegenerate,
SteaneK is degenerate for K ≥ 2.
Both H and Λ(X) have transversal encodings in SteaneK , that is, encodings where H (resp.
Λ(X)) is applied to each physical qubit (resp. each pair of physical qubits). More formally,
H(a) (the Hadamard gate acting on the ath logical qubit) is encoded by a sequence of gates
O1(a), . . . , Oℓ(a), where ℓ = 7
K , and Oi(a) is the Hadamard gate acting on the ith physical qubit of
the ath logical qubit. The gate Λ(X)(a) is encoded as a sequence of gates O1(a), . . . , Oℓ(a), where
ℓ = 7K , and Oi(a1, a2) is the Λ(X) gate with the control on the ith physical qubit of the a1th logical
qubit, and the X gate on the ith physical qubit of the a2th logical qubit. In both cases, no ancilla
states are necessary. These encodings are shown in Figure 9.
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HH
...
H
H
(a) H on encoded single-qubit state
control • · · ·
qubits • · · ·
...
· · · •
target · · ·
qubits · · ·
...
· · ·
(b) Λ(X) on encoded two-qubit state
Figure 9: SteaneK encodings of H and Λ(X)
In order to complete a universal gateset, we show now how to apply Toffoli gates using Clifford
operations and Toffoli magic states. The Toffoli magic state is the three-qubit state prepared by the
following circuit:
|0〉 H •
|0〉 H •
|0〉
Explicitly, the state is
|Toffoli〉 = 1
2
∑
d,e
|d, e, de〉.
Z • •
Z • •
• X • •
• • • X
• Z X •
Z
|Toffoli〉
Figure 10: The Toffoli gadget
The Toffoli gate can be implemented using the Toffoli magic state, measurements of Z and
X observables, and classically controlled Clifford gates, using the circuit shown in Figure 10 (the
double wires in this circuit are classical bits).
5.5.2 Concatenated Steane code is simulatable
We are now ready to prove Theorem 6.
48
Proof of Theorem 6. Let K > log(s+ 3), and let us consider the SteaneK code. We have that it is is
a [[7K , 1, 3K ]] stabilizer code, and since s is constant, so is K and m = 7K .
As discussed previously, the gates H and Λ(X) can be implemented transversally in SteaneK ,
and the Toffoli gates can be applied using |Toffoli〉 magic-state and the circuit in Figure 10. We
remark that in such a gadget, we need to apply controlled H and Λ(X) gates, and SteaneK is
order-consistent with such gates. Finally, it is not hard to calculate that the measurement result of
Figure 10 are uniformly random bits for all input states ρ. In this case, all of the assumptions of
Propositions 25 and 29 are attained, and therefore SteaneK is a s-simulatable code.
A Differences between [19] and the zero knowledge protocol VZK
The structure and format of the protocol VZK is essentially the same as the protocols that arise
from protocol compression in [19]. However, we list the few differences and provide explanations
for why the soundness of the protocol is unaffected by these changes.
1. The outer code for VZK is a 4-qubit error detecting code, instead of the 7-qubit Steane code.
As mentioned in Section 2, the soundness analysis of [19] only requires two properties from
the outer code, and those properties are satisfied by the 4-qubit error detecting code. This
is why we are able to have fewer additional provers than in the protocol compression result
of [19].
2. The questions to the verifier players in VZK are six tuples of commuting two-qubit Pauli ob-
servables, whereas in [19] they are triples. This is because the verifier players are in charge
of measuring the clock qubits as well as the snapshot qubits, whereas in [19] the clock mea-
surements were delegated to a different set of players. However the clock measurements are
also just Pauli measurements, so we can simply merge the snapshot and clock measurements
together.
3. In the protocol VZK , the referee may ask questions QFi or AFi to prover player PPi, which
does not occur in the compression protocol of [19]. The referee will ask these questions when
it decides to check the propagation of the gate at time t⋆(i) − 1 (in which case it will send
question QFi to PPi), or at time t⋆(i) + 1 (in which case it will send question AFi to PPi).
The check performed by the referee is the identical to that when it tests the propagation of
the prover gate ⋆i.
For completeness, in the honest strategy the prover player PPi measures a σX on a designated
“question flag” register (when asked questionQFi), or measures a σX on a designated “answer
flag” register (when asked question AFi).
Soundness is unaffected. If there was no valid history state before the addition of the QF and
AF questions, then there is no valid history state with them.
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